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Abstract 
 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are increasingly 
being connected to corporate networks which has dramatically expanded their attack 
surface to remote cyber attack.  Adversaries are targeting these systems with increasing 
frequency and sophistication.  This thesis seeks to answer the research question 
addressing which Information Assurance (IA) controls are most significant for network 
defenders and SCADA system managers/operators to focus on in order to increase the 
security of critical infrastructure systems against a Stuxnet-like cyber attack.  This 
research applies the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) IA controls to 
an attack tree modeled on a remote Stuxnet-like cyber attack against the WPAFB fuels 
operation.  The probability of adversary success of specific attack scenarios is developed 
via the attack tree.  Then an impact assessment is obtained via a survey of WPAFB fuels 
operation subject matter experts (SMEs).  The probabilities of adversary success and 
impact analysis are used to create a Risk Level matrix, which is analyzed to identify 
recommended IA controls.  The culmination of this research identified 14 IA controls 
associated with mitigating an adversary from gaining remote access and deploying an 
exploit as the most influential for SCADA managers, operators and network defenders to 
focus on in order to maximize system security against a Stuxnet-like remote cyber attack.   
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EVALUATING INFORMATION ASSURANCE CONTROL  
EFFECTIVENESS ON AN AIR FORCE SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA 
ACQUISITION (SCADA) SYSTEM 
 
I. Introduction 
 The frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure continues 
to escalate.  A complex computer worm discovered in June 2010 effectively disabled Iran‟s 
nuclear program for more than a year (Barnes, 2010).  The highly secure Iranian nuclear 
facilities were located underground, physically and electromagnetically isolated from insecure 
networks, also known as air gapped from the Internet.  It is suspected that the worm propagated 
from universal serial bus (USB) thumb drives that technicians carried in and out of the facility 
which closed the air gap and allowed the worm to penetrate the SCADA system.  The highly 
complex computer worm, called Stuxnet, was designed to jump from computer to computer until 
it found a specific control system that it targeted (Barnes, 2010).  Computer experts examining 
the worm have described it as the first weaponized computer virus.  According to Ralph Lagner, 
the computer expert who first sounded the alarm about Stuxnet, it is “like the arrival of an F-35 
into a World War I battlefield” (Barnes, 2010). 
 According to Warden (1998), when applying his five-ring system model of the adversary 
it is imperative to approach the enemy as an interdependent system versus an opposing army, 
navy and air force.  The concentric rings of his model point to the relative importance as they 
radiate out from the center which contains the leadership, see Figure 1.  Critical infrastructures 
fall within the second, system essentials ring and third, infrastructure ring of the five-ring 
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systems model, making them relatively more important than population and fielded military 
(Warden, 1998).  Modern societies and militaries have become increasingly dependent on critical 
infrastructure such as electrical power generation/distribution, petroleum refining/distribution, 
telecommunications.  These critical infrastructures also form a critical vulnerability to the 
industries that make modern societies and economies flourish.  They also provide the logistical 
support to allow a nation to successfully prosecute war.   
 
Figure 1. Warden’s Five Rings (Warden, 1995) 
 
Background 
The systems that control critical infrastructures are Industrial Control Systems (ICS) 
which encompass several types of control systems including Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other smaller control 
systems such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) (Stouffer, Falco & Scarfone, 2008).  
Industries associated with critical infrastructure include power generation and distribution, oil 
and gasoline refining and distribution, water and waste systems, chemical processing and 
transport, manufacturing, telecommunications, and banking infrastructures (Munro, 2008).  In 
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the past, these systems were isolated from corporate networks and the Internet, which insulated 
them from remote cyber attacks and provided security through obscurity.  However, these 
systems are increasingly being connected to corporate networks in order to increase operating 
efficiencies and reduce costs (Stouffer et al., 2008).  Also, open source technical information on 
SCADA systems is readily available to attackers (Stouffer et al., 2008).  This has dramatically 
increased the attack surface of SCADA systems to remote cyber attack.  Note:  Throughout this 
thesis, Industrial Control Systems will be referred to as Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems for consistency. 
 SCADA systems typically require high system availability due to the safety of ongoing 
industrial processes.  Disruption of system processes can cause an enormous negative financial 
impact and even potential for loss of life.  Because of the critical nature of these systems they are 
prime targets for terrorists, or a nation state adversary, especially during wartime.  According to 
a MacAfee survey of over six hundred IT executives, the majority, 59% believe that foreign 
governments are already involved in cyber attacks against their critical infrastructure (Baker, 
Waterman & Ivanov, 2010).  Additionally 80% of the respondents acknowledge connecting their 
SCADA systems to an IP network despite the risks.  Finally, the survey also revealed that less 
than 50% of the critical infrastructure providers implement basic security measures (Baker et al., 
2010).  The MacAfee report highlights the widespread vulnerability of critical infrastructures 
world-wide.  There is significant room for improvement in securing SCADA systems from cyber 
attack.  The federal government has recognized it has an important role to ensure critical 
infrastructures are protected.  The federal government has developed policies and partnerships 
with private industry in an effort to secure critical infrastructures through a number of executive 
orders, laws, and plans. 
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 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-82 
describe Information Assurance (IA) controls that apply to information systems in support of the 
Federal government.  These IA controls are the management, operational, and technical controls 
that are considered industry best practices and government recommendations and guidance.  
They serve to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its 
information.  IA controls are the primary means through which SCADA systems are made 
defensively strong to withstand cyber attacks.  NIST recommends a defense-in-depth approach 
of layering IA controls in order to achieve an effective cyber security posture (Stouffer et al., 
2008).  The defense-in-depth approach employs successive layers of policy, operational 
procedures and technology in a variety of methods to secure systems to achieve multilayer, 
multidimensional protection, like the defenses of a medieval castle (Ashley & Jackson, 1999). 
Research Goals 
Current literature does not show an indication of the degree to which IA controls increase 
the security of SCADA systems.  My research will apply NIST IA controls in an attack tree to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the IA controls.  Attack trees are graphically represented by an up-
side down tree with the root node as the overall goal of the attack (Schneier, 1999).  Sub goals 
and leaf nodes provide different paths to the root.  The cyber attack is based on the recent 
Stuxnet exploit (Mills, 2010).  The attack tree model is based on the Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base (WPAFB) fuels operation.  This operation is a small, government owned, contractor 
operated Air Force base fuels operation.  According to the Fuels flight contract branch chief, the 
WPAFB fuels operation represents 70% of the Air Force fuels flight implementations in the 
CONUS.  Air Force Fuels Policy Directive 08-002, dated 10 November 2008 directs 
implementation of fuels Automated Information Technology (AIT) hardware and software 
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(Hession, 2008).  The Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) SCADA system is operated and 
maintained by nearly all of the CONUS AF fuels operations (DLA, 2009).  By examining the 
probability of adversary success of specific attack scenarios along with WPAFB fuels operation 
subject matter experts (SMEs) impact assessment, an overall risk is produced which highlights 
the most significant groups of IA controls which contribute to increased security.   
 This research seeks to answer the research question:  Which group of NIST 800-82 IA 
controls are most significant for network defenders and SCADA system managers/operators to 
focus on in order to increase the security of the WPAFB Fuels flight critical infrastructure 
systems against a Stuxnet-like remote attack?  Since Stuxnet is currently recognized as the most 
advanced exploit against critical infrastructure, this research is timely in order to identify IA 
controls which are most effective to mitigate a Stuxnet-like attack.   
Thesis Organization 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine which group of IA Controls are most effective 
to mitigate a particular type of cyber attack against an Air Force fuels operation.  The 
introduction provided background material, established the research goals and introduced the 
research question.  Chapter 2 provides background on critical infrastructures and related 
research.  It describes SCADA systems along with polices that govern their security.  It 
compares and contrasts SCADA systems with traditional information technology systems and 
describes recent cyber attacks against critical infrastructure.  Additionally, this chapter provides 
background on attack trees and explains how they function.  Finally, it introduces the Stuxnet 
exploit.  Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology.  It describes what data was collected and 
how the data was used.  Also, how the results will be analyzed.  Chapter 4 presents the analysis 
of the data.  Critical aspects of a risk matrix are examined and the most influential IA controls 
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are identified.  Chapter 5 presents the conclusions, recommendations for future work and 
limitations to this approach.    
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"Throughout the Entire Course of History, Warfare is Always Changing." --Andre Beaufre 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on SCADA systems in 
general and review previous research in the area of SCADA systems.  Also, it provides 
information on the Stuxnet worm, IA Controls, Fault trees, and Attack Trees. 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Overview 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) encompass several types of control systems including 
SCADA systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other smaller control system 
components such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) (Stouffer et al., 2008).  Figure 2 
shows a high level view of a typical SCADA system architecture.   
SCADA systems are defined as a collection of systems, software and equipment that 
allows an operator in a remote location to maintain situational awareness and exert control of 
portions of, or an entire, industrial operation (Carlson, 2002).  SCADA systems were designed to 
enable control of large scale industrial processes and provide a means for their safe and efficient 
operation and delivery (Munro, 2008).  SCADA systems are typically geographically dispersed 
and contain many data collection points.  As an example, eighty percent of the United States‟ 
power is generated by 270 utilities.  Each utility has its own SCADA system that contains up to 
50,000 telemetry collection points (Fernandez and Fernandez, 2005).  In some cases, the number 
of data collection points are in the 100,000 range, and a few instances near 1 million (Daneels 
and Salter, 1999).   
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Figure 2. High level view of SCADA system Architecture (Stouffer et al., 2008) 
 
These systems typically require total and absolute system availability (Gold, 2009).  
Absolute system availability is required due to the safety of ongoing industrial processes.  
Disruption of these processes can also cause enormous negative financial impacts and even 
potential for loss of life.  For instance, a large gas line explosion would cost the parent company 
financial loss and also has the potential for human injury or death, depending on the location 
(Carmody, Hammerschmidt, Goglia & Black, 2002).  For instance, on 20 September 2010, a gas 
line explosion in San Bruno, California killed 6 peoples and destroyed 30 homes (Hennessy-
Fiske, 2010).  Also, on 19 January 2011, an explosion of a gas line in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
killed one person, injured five and burned two homes (Stamm, 2011).  The underlying cause of 
both explosions are still under investigation as of this writing.   
 Many industries utilize SCADA systems.  Some of these industries include power 
generation and distribution, oil and gasoline refining and distribution, water and waste systems, 
chemical processing and transport, manufacturing, telecommunications, and banking 
infrastructures (Munro, 2008).  They form centers of gravity for societies and governments.  
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According to the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms (2010), a center of gravity is the source of 
power that provides a nation the moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act 
(Mullen, 2010).  They provide the life blood for modern societies to operate efficiently.  Indeed, 
critical infrastructures form a center of gravity for the U.S.  Approximately 90 percent of the 
U.S. critical infrastructure is owned by private companies (Stouffer et al., 2008).    
A great deal of SCADA systems in operation today were installed 15 to 20 years ago, 
when attack threats were more physical (Gold, 2009).  Information security was not a significant 
concern when most SCADA systems were initially installed.  Today these networks are 
threatened electronically when they are connected to a corporate network, which is typically 
connected to the Internet.     
Government Role in SCADA security 
The U.S. government has recognized the important role that critical infrastructures play 
in the functioning of government, the economy, and society in general.  The federal government 
has a responsibility in ensuring these infrastructures are protected.  It has taken steps, in the form 
of policy and regulation, to facilitate increased security of these critical systems.  The next 
several sub-paragraphs present in chronological order many of these policies and other initiatives 
the U.S. government has taken to facilitate critical infrastructure security.  
Critical Infrastructure Protection 
On 15 July 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010.  The purpose of this 
order was to develop a strategy to protect critical infrastructures.  The order established the 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), and a number of 
associated committees, whose mission was to examine the problem of securing critical 
infrastructures.  The Infrastructure Protection Task Force (IPTF) was also established to identify 
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and coordinate existing expertise in the public and private sector.  The PCCIP along with related 
committees and the IPTF were all temporary in nature and terminated on or before seven months 
after the executive order was signed (Clinton, 1996). 
Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 
On 22 May 1998 President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 62 and 
63.  Both seek to strengthen the nation‟s defenses.  The directives dealt with emerging 
unconventional threats and protection of U.S. critical infrastructure.  A key tie-in between the 
two, described in PDD-62 is the establishment of the office of the National Coordinator for 
Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism.  The two sections below provide 
additional details of the two PDDs. 
Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure 
On 22 May 1998, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 to 
further address critical infrastructure protection.  PDD-63 clearly identified critical 
infrastructures as physical and cyber systems that are essential to the minimal operations of both 
the economy and government (Clinton, 1998).  Additionally, the directive identified 
telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency 
services, both governmental and private as examples of critical infrastructure sectors.  The intent 
of this document was to ensure that the United States would take necessary steps to eliminate 
significant vulnerabilities to critical infrastructures, with an emphasis on cyber systems.  PDD-63 
also emphasized that the protection of critical infrastructures is a shared responsibility and 
partnership between the commercial entities and the government.  Finally, the directive 
designated lead agencies for 15 specific sectors and functions of critical infrastructure.   
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Combating Terrorism  
On 22 May 1998, President Clinton also signed PDD 62, “Protection against 
Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas”, which reaffirms PDD-63 
vs. policy on Counter Terrorism.  This classified document creates a more systematic approach 
to fighting the terrorist threat.  It clarifies the activities of many U.S. agencies charged with roles 
in defeating terrorism.  In order to achieve a heightened level of coordination, it also established 
the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-
Terrorism (Clinton, 1998).  
Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 
Section 1016 of the Patriot Act is referred to as the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act 
of 2001.  It establishes the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) to 
serve as the source of national competence to address critical infrastructure protection and 
continuity.  The act also further clarified the definitions of critical infrastructures as: 
Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that 
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or 
any combination of those matters (Bush, 2001). 
 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age 
On 16 October 2001 President Bush signed Executive Order 13231, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age.  EO 13231 established the President‟s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board.  The board is responsible for recommending policies and 
coordinating programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure, including 
emergency preparedness communications, and the physical assets that support such systems 
(Bush, 2001). 
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Patriot Act of 2001 
On 26 October 2001, the Patriot Act of 2001 was approved by President Bush.  The 
Patriot Act of 2001 significantly increased the ability of law enforcement agencies to search 
telephone and e-mail communications, medical, financial, and other records.  Additionally, it 
eased restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States and broadened the 
discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants 
suspected of terrorism-related acts.  Finally, the act expanded the definition of terrorism to 
include domestic terrorism (Bush, 2001). 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002 
In July 2002, President Bush published the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  This was the first document of its kind.  The purpose of the Strategy was to 
mobilize and organize in order to secure the nation form terrorist attacks.  It laid out three 
priorities:  1) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 2) Reduce America‟s 
vulnerability to terrorism, and 3) Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur (Bush, 2002). 
National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 
 
In February 2003, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets was signed by President Bush.  It seeks to facilitate the strategic 
planning process for core mission areas and reduce the nation‟s vulnerability by protecting our 
critical infrastructures and key assets from physical attack.  It aligns homeland security efforts 
into six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, 
domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructures and key assets, defending against 
catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response.  It also provides a unified 
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organizational structure and identified specific initiatives to protect critical infrastructures (Bush, 
2003).   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 
On 17 December, 2003 the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 was signed by 
President Bush.  It established a national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify 
and prioritize critical infrastructure and to protect them from terrorist attacks.  It defines terms 
and asserts 31 policy statements.  These policy statements provide additional detail of and define 
the roles various federal, state, and local agencies will play in carrying out the directive (Bush, 
2003).  See Appendix A for listing of Roles and Responsibilities of Sector-Specific Federal 
Agencies.   
National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007 
In October 2007, an updated National Strategy for Homeland Security was published by 
President Bush.  It addressed safeguarding and preserving the nation‟s Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Resources (CIKR).  The Strategy builds directly from the first National Strategy for 
Homeland Security published in 2002.  This updated Strategy incorporates lessons learned from 
exercises and real-world catastrophes.  It also complements the National Security Strategy and 
the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, both published in 2006.  The purpose of the 
strategy is to guide, organize, and unify U.S. homeland security efforts on four goals:  1) prevent 
and disrupt terrorist attacks, 2) protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key 
resources, 3) respond to and recover from incidents that do occur, and 4) continue to strengthen 
the foundation to ensure long-term success.  Table 1 identifies 17 sectors of critical infrastructure 
and key resources established by the 2007 strategy. 
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Table 1. 17 Sectors of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (Bush, 2007), (Bush, 2003) 
Sectors of Critical Infrastructure  
and Key resources Description 
Agriculture and Food 
The supply chains for feed, animals, and animal products; Crop 
production and the supply chains of seed, fertilizer, and other necessary 
related materials; and post-harvesting components.  
Banking and Finance 
Variety of physical structures, to include buildings and financial 
utilities, as well as human capital. Also payment, clearing and 
settlement systems and electronic and physical transfer of assets. 
*Chemical 
Manufactures of products such as fertilizer, chlorine, and polymers.  
Depends on raw materials, manufacturing plants and processes, and 
distribution systems, research facilities, transportation and electricity. 
*Commercial Facilities 
Commercial centers, office buildings, sports stadiums, theme parks, and 
other sites where large numbers of people congregate to pursue 
business activities, conduct commercial transactions, or recreation.  
*Commercial Nuclear Reactors, 
Materials, and Waste 
Robust containment buildings, redundant safety systems, 
and sheltered spent fuel storage facilities. 
*Dams 
Larger Dams provide water and electricity to cities, and agriculture. 
The federal government is responsible for roughly 10 percent of the 
dams whose failure could cause significant property damage or have 
public health and safety consequences. 
Defense Industrial Base Private industries supporting the DOD. 
Drinking Water and Water 
Treatment Systems 
Fresh water supply and wastewater collection and treatment.  These 
utilities depend on reservoirs, dams, wells, and aquifers, treatment 
facilities, pumping stations, aqueducts, and transmission pipelines. 
Emergency Services 
Fire, rescue, emergency medical service, and law enforcement 
organizations that are employed to save lives and property in the event 
of an accident, natural disaster, or terrorist incident. 
Energy 
Generation, production, distribution and command and control of 
electricity and oil and natural gas. 
Government Facilities 
Federally owned or operated facilities, including DOD and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. 
Information Technology 
Information systems, networks, Communication systems, Internet, 
facilities, human and intellectual capital, networks, communications 
lines, infrastructures and IT services.   
*National Monuments and Icons 
Diverse array of national monuments, symbols, and icons that represent 
our Nation‟s heritage, traditions and values, and political power.  
Postal and Shipping 
Depends on a transportation fleet composed of both service-owned and 
contractor-operated vehicles and equipment. Mail also travels daily by 
commercial aircraft, truck, railroad, and ship. 
Public Health and Health Care 
State and local health departments, hospitals, health clinics, mental 
health facilities, nursing homes, blood-supply facilities, laboratories, 
mortuaries, and pharmaceutical stockpiles. 
Telecommunications 
Provides voice and data service to public and private users through a 
complex and diverse public-network infrastructure encompassing the 
Public Switched Telecommunications Network (PSTN), the Internet, 
and private enterprise networks. 
Transportation Systems 
Aviation, maritime traffic, rail, pipelines, highways, 
trucking and busing, and public mass transit. 
* Denotes sectors added by 2007 Strategy 
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National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
 In 2009, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was signed by Michael 
Chertoff.  It seeks to make U.S. critical infrastructures and key resources more resilient to 
disruption.  The NIPP also lays out a risk management framework which enables risk-informed 
decision making to mitigate effects of terrorist attacks through risk management actions.  It also 
contains the most current mapping of sector-specific agency to critical infrastructure sector.  
Table 2 provides a mapping of government agency to critical infrastructure (Chertoff, 2009).   
Table 2. Government agency to Critical Infrastructure mapping (Chertoff, 2009) 
Sector-Specific Agency Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources sector 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Agriculture and Food 
Department of Defense Defense Industrial Base 
Department of Energy Energy 
Department of Health and Human Services Healthcare and Public Health 
Department of the Interior National Monuments and Icons 
Department of the Treasury Banking and Finance 
Environmental Protection Agency Water 
Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Infrastructure Protection 
Chemical Commercial Facilities, Critical 
Manufacturing,  Dams, Emergency Services, Nuclear 
reactors, Materials, and waste 
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications Information Technology Communications 
Transportation Security Administration Postal and Shipping 
Transportation Security Administration  
United States Coast Guard 
Transportation Systems 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Federal Protective Service 
Government Facilities 
 
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 
 On January 14, 2010, DOD Directive (DODD) 3020.40 established the Defense Critical 
Infrastructure Program (DCIP).  It established the responsibilities of the DOD, pursuant to 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and the National Industrial Security Program DODD 
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5220.22 of 2004.  The DCIP sought to align DOD efforts in support of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan.  DCIP contains DOD sector-specific agency responsibilities for 
the national Defense Industrial Base (DIB) sector (Lynn, 2010).   
Summary of Government Role in SCADA security 
The U.S. government has recognized the important role that critical infrastructures play 
in the functioning of government, the economy, and society in general.  The previous sections 
described a number of steps it has taken via policy and regulation to facilitate increased security 
of critical infrastructures.  These extensive efforts by the federal government highlight the 
relevance of this research on the effectiveness of IA controls.  The next section compares and 
contrasts characteristics of SCADA and IT systems.   
Comparing SCADA and IT systems 
Information Technology (IT) and SCADA systems were built for different purposes and 
are governed by different core principles.  When SCADA systems were created, the primary 
concern was for reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA) (Byres et al., 2003).  
SCADA systems were created to support critical infrastructure control processes.  Security was 
considered from the standpoint of physical security, consisting of closed systems with controlled 
access to the network and consoles.  This method required attackers to have access and be able to 
come in physical contact with the equipment they were attempting to affect.  In contrast, IT 
systems‟ core principles are confidentially, integrity and availability (CIA) (Bishop, 2003).  See 
Figure 3 for graphical representation of RMA and CIA core principals.  Computers were 
originally networked together to support research efforts.  Now the Internet is primarily used for 
communications, information, commerce and entertainment.   
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Figure 3.  RMA and CIA core principles (Byres et al., 2003), (Bishop, 2003) 
 
Perhaps the most significant differences between SCADA and IT networks are their 
requirements for availability, latency, and security.  IT network users tolerate periodic outages 
where service is not available.  However, SCADA systems are required to operate uninterrupted 
for months and in some cases years (Byres and Lowe, 2004).  Furthermore, IT systems typically 
operate with considerable variation in communication path latency.  However, SCADA systems 
cannot tolerate increased latency due to proprietary protocols and safety requirements for timely 
human interaction (Byres and Lowe, 2004).  Another significant difference between the two is 
illustrated with the end devices.  In an IT network there is a high tolerance for periodic end 
device, ie. computer outages.  There is a greater concern of keeping the core network servers 
operating in the network operations center.  In SCADA systems, however, the end device is 
extremely important in that it provides telemetry to the central facility.  If telemetry is not 
available, then serious problems can arise (Byres and Lowe, 2004).  Since SCADA systems are 
now being connected to IT networks the security vulnerabilities inherent to SCADA systems can 
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now be exploited via the IT network.  Table 3 summarizes some of the differences between IT 
systems and SCADA systems. 
Table 3. Differences between IT and SCADA systems (Stouffer et al., 2008) 
Characteristic IT System SCADA System 
Performance Requirements 
Non-real-time 
Response must be consistent 
High throughput is demanded 
High delay and jitter maybe acceptable 
Real-time 
Response is time-critical 
Modest throughput is acceptable 
High delay and/or jitter is a serious concern 
Availability Requirements 
Responses such as rebooting are acceptable 
Availability deficiencies can often be 
tolerated 
Rebooting may not be acceptable  
Outages must be planned and scheduled well in advance 
Exhaustive pre-deployment testing required 
Risk Management Requirements 
Confidentiality and integrity is paramount 
Fault tolerance is less important – 
momentary downtime is not a major risk 
Delay of business operations is major risk 
Human safety paramount, followed by process protection 
Fault tolerance is essential, downtime not acceptable 
Major risk impact is regulatory non-compliance, loss of 
life, equipment, or production 
Architecture Security Focus 
Primary focus is protecting the IT assets, 
and the information stored on or transmitted  
Central server may require more protection 
Primary goal is to protect edge clients (e.g., field devices 
such as process controllers) 
Protection of central server is still important 
Unintended Consequences 
Security solutions are designed around 
typical IT systems 
Security tools must be tested to ensure that they do not 
compromise normal ICS operation 
Time-Critical Interaction 
Less critical emergency interaction 
Tightly restricted access control can be 
implemented to the degree necessary 
Response to human, other emergency interaction is critical 
Access to ICS should be strictly controlled, yet not hamper 
human-machine interaction 
System Operation 
Systems are designed for use with typical 
operating systems 
Upgrades are straightforward  
Differing and custom operating systems often without 
security capabilities 
Software changes must be carefully made 
Resource Constraints 
Systems are specified with enough 
resources to support the addition of third-
party applications such as security solutions 
Systems are designed to support the intended industrial 
process, with minimal memory and computing resources to 
support the addition of security technology 
Communications 
Standard communications protocols 
Mostly wired networks with some wireless  
Typical IT networking practices 
Many proprietary and standard communication protocols 
Many types of comm.  media used including wire/wireless  
Complex networks, require expertise of control engineers 
Change Management 
applied in a timely fashion in the presence 
of good security policy and procedures. The 
Procedures are often automated. 
Must be thoroughly tested and deployed incrementally 
throughout a system.  ICS outages must be scheduled 
days/weeks in advance 
Managed Support Diversified support styles Usually  single vendor 
Component Lifetime 3-5 years 15-20 years 
Access to Components local and easy to access 
isolated, remote, and require extensive physical effort to 
gain access to them 
 
 With such significant differences among the key characteristics of IT and SCADA 
systems, it follows that joining the two together in a networked environment may lead to 
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negative consequences.  One consequence is unintentionally exposing SCADA systems to 
exploitation and electronic attack.   
Risk Factors 
 There are several factors which increase the risk associated with SCADA systems.  These 
include: 1. standardized protocols and technologies, 2. connectivity to other networks, 3. 
insecure and rogue connections, and 4. widespread availability of technical specifications 
(Stouffer et al., 2008).  These factors increase the attack surface of SCADA systems.  They are 
each discussed further in the next four sections.   
Standardized Protocols and Technologies 
 Vendors are openly publishing their equipment specifications to allow third parties to 
generate compatible add-ons.  They are also transitioning from proprietary systems to open 
systems to reduce cost and remain competitive.  Increasing in popularity standard technologies 
like Microsoft Windows® and common network protocols like TCP/IP.  Standardized protocols 
and networking technology vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques are widely published on 
the Internet.  The increased use of standard protocols increases the risk to SCADA systems 
(Stouffer et al., 2008). 
Connectivity to other networks 
Many organizations have connected their SCADA systems to a corporate network in 
order to improve ease of access to resources by operational personnel to conduct maintenance 
and diagnostics.  Connectivity to the SCADA system allows management to make operational 
and purchasing decisions.  Connecting the SCADA network to a corporate network exposes all 
of the SCADA components to the corporate network.  The corporate network in-turn has 
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network connections to the Internet and in many cases other corporate partner networks as well.  
An adversary can use these connections to attack the SCADA system (Stouffer et al., 2008). 
Insecure and rogue connections 
Modems are typically used by vendors to perform maintenance, diagnostics and system 
health monitoring.  These connection points introduce a significant risk to SCADA systems.  
While modems provide great reach-back capability at significant cost savings, they also provide 
an entry into the SCADA network.  If the modem does not use an authentication scheme, it can 
be easily exploited.  In some cases, systems come pre-installed with modems that are configured 
with a default password that is never changed (Stouffer et al., 2008).  The same is true for some 
wireless connections (Stouffer et al., 2008).  Some wireless encryption is very weak and leave 
networks susceptible to a determined hacker.  Also, connections opened for vendors to do 
temporary work are a risk, especially if they are forgotten about (Stouffer et al., 2008).  
Additionally, hard-wired connections that do not have strong authentication and encryption can 
also be easily breeched (Stouffer et al., 2008). 
Widespread availability of technical specifications 
Technical information for SCADA system components are widely available to the public 
for free or purchase.  This information aids industry professionals to maintain their expertise and 
assists in development of future control systems.  Anyone with access to the Internet can gain 
specific technical information and in some cases operating manuals for vendor specific 
equipment.  With this widespread availability of information, it is possible for a determined 
attacker who has little knowledge of SCADA systems to utilize automated attack tools against 
them (Stouffer et al., 2008).   
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Vulnerabilities of SCADA Systems 
It is becoming increasingly common for critical infrastructure sectors to connect their 
SCADA system to enterprise or corporate networks which inadvertently act as a gateway to the 
Internet (Stouffer et al., 2008).  The Internet connection provides another avenue for attackers 
targeting SCADA systems.  Since SCADA systems are connected to an IP network, they are 
vulnerable to most of the IP exploits that hackers use.  In addition to physical access and 
connection to IP networks as attack vectors, SCADA systems are also vulnerable to attack 
through telephone modems, wireless networks, laptop computers, and trusted vendor connections 
(Byres et al., 2003).  According to Ken Munro, managing director of SecureTest, they have 
discovered a new vulnerability in every SCADA test they have conducted (Munro, 2008)
1
.   
The Department of Homeland Security staged an experiment called Aurora in March 
2007, at the Department of Energy‟s (DOE) Idaho Lab (Meserve, 2007).  A video recording 
demonstrated how a large industrial generator commonly deployed in the nation‟s power grid 
could be destroyed by a remotely connected computer hacker.  Multiple, simultaneous attacks 
such as this could knock out power over a large geographical area for months, causing significant 
harm to the U.S. economy.  Scott Borg, an economist working on federal government projects, 
stated that if a third of the country lost power for three months, it would cost $700 billion, 
causing greater damage than the great depression (Meserve, 2007).   
The DOE Aurora experiment demonstrated how an adversary can cause significant 
damage to the power grid by cyber means with only a few lines of code.  In a SCADA 
environment, something as ordinarily mundane as a network scan can be enough to cause  
 
 
1
SecureTest is a provider of expert penetration and security testing, with over 500 clients across the private, 
public sectors (SecureTest, 2010).  
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equipment to malfunction (Fernandez and Fernandez, 2005).  Unlike IT systems, which are 
routinely patched as needed, SCADA systems are only patched every few years due to high 
demand of availability (Fernandez and Fernandez, 2005).  SCADA systems are also highly 
vulnerable to malformed packets, causing them to stop functioning, as compared to IT networks 
which would merely discard them.     
The National Institute of Standards and Technology‟s Guide to Industrial Control 
Systems points out that vulnerabilities can exist in policy and procedures, platform configuration, 
platform hardware, platform software, malware protection, network configuration vulnerabilities, 
network hardware, network perimeter, network monitoring and logging, communications, and 
wireless connections (Stouffer et al., 2008).  In the past the hacker community lacked expertise 
in exploiting SCADA systems.  However now that SCADA systems can be reached from the 
Internet, hackers will likely have interest in exploiting them.   
In July 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security 
Program (CSSP) issued a report titled “Common Cyber Security Vulnerabilities Observed in 
DHS Industrial Control Systems Assessments” that present the results from 15 ICS assessments 
performed from 2004 through 2008.  The purpose of the assessments was to provide information 
to critical infrastructure providers on vulnerabilities, so they could increase the security of their 
SCADA systems.  Vulnerability information was collected and analyzed.  Common 
vulnerabilities were grouped into general categories.  The analysis of the data collected found 
that poor network protocol implementations, information disclosure, and authentication problems 
occurred with the most frequency (DHS, 2009).  Table 4 contains a listing of the common 
vulnerabilities discovered from the assessments.   
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Table 4. Summary of Common CSSP ICS assessment findings (DHS, 2009) 
 
 
ICS Security Controls 
According to Stouffer et al. (2008), security controls are one of various security 
mechanisms which when implemented correctly can impede an adversary by mitigating system 
Category Common Vulnerability
Poor Code Quality Use of potentially dangerous functions in proprietary ICS application
Poor authentication
Directory traversal enabled
Unauthenticated access to Web server
Lack of input validation: Buffer overflow in ICS service
Lack of input validation: Lack of bounds checking in ICS Service
ICS protocol uses weak authentication
ICS protocol uses weak integrity checks
ICS product relies on standard IT protocol that uses weak encryption
Unpatched or old versions of third-party applications incorporated into ICS 
software
Unpatched operating system
ICS uses standard IT protocol that uses weak encryption
Use of standard IT protocol with clear-text authentication
Client-side enforcement of server-side security
Improper security configuration
No password required
Weak passwords
Weak password requirements
Unauthorized directory traversal allowed
Services running with unnecessary privileges
Unencrypted proprietary ICS protocol communication
Unencrypted nonproprietary ICS protocol communication
Unencrypted services common in IT systems
Open network shares on ICS hosts
Weak protection of user credentials
Information leak through unsecure service configuration
Lack of network segmentation
Firewall bypassed
Access to specific ports on host not restricted to required IP addresses
Port Security not implemented on network equipment
Network Component 
Configuration 
Vulnerabilities
Network Design 
Vulnerabilities
Information Disclosure
Vulnerable Web 
Services
Poor Network Protocol 
Implementations
Poor Patch 
Management
Weak Authentication
Least User Privileges 
Violation
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vulnerabilities.  Security controls consist of management, operational, and technical safeguards 
or countermeasures put in place for an information system to protect the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the system and its information (Ross, Stoneburner, Porter, Rogers, 
Swanson, Graubart  et al., 2007).  Organizations need to determine which security controls are 
needed to protect their information systems and operation.  They must also determine the needed 
level of assurance.  These controls are measured when put in place to ensure they are providing 
the protection desired.  Security controls are recommended for use by organizations for 
protecting their information systems and should be employed as part of a larger well-defined and 
documented information security program (Ross et al., 2007).  Table 5 lists the classes and 
families of the 17 Security Controls.  
Table 5. Security Control Families and Classes (Ross et al., 2007) 
 
 
FAMILY CLASS
Access Control Technical
Awareness and Training Operational
Audit and Accountability Technical
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments Management
Configuration Management Operational
Contingency Planning Operational
Identification and Authentication Technical
Incident Response Operational
Maintenance Operational
Media Protection Operational
Physical and Environmental Protection Operational
Planning Management
Personnel Security Operational
Risk Assessment Management
System and Services Acquisition Management
System and Communication Protection Technical
System and Information Integrity Operational
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ICS specific security control guidance is found in Appendix I of NIST Special 
Publication 800-53.  It takes the guidance for IT systems and tailors it specifically for ICS.  
These changes recognize the differences in ICS and IT systems and provide additional focus to 
the need for real-time response and extremely high availability, predictability, and reliability 
(Ross et al., 2007). 
Threats to SCADA Systems 
 A threat is defined as an indication of imminent danger (Merriam-Webster, 2010).  
SCADA systems are subject to threats similar to that of computer systems and 
telecommunications networks.  These threats can come from both electromagnetic and physical 
means.  Threats can come from people, natural disasters, accidents, and equipment failures 
(DHS, 2005).  Adversarial threats are a subset of threats consisting of people motivated to 
negatively impact SCADA systems.  Other forms of threats like natural disasters and equipment 
failures are important to plan for in order to protect SCADA systems, but are not the focus of this 
literature review.  The adversarial threats along with their description and motivations are listed 
in Table 6.   
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Table 6. Adversarial Threats to ICSs and motivations (DHS, 2005), (Grimes, 2005) 
Threat agent Description Motivation 
Malicious intruders 
Remote Hacking once required a fair amount of skill or computer 
knowledge, attackers can now download attack scripts and protocols from 
the Internet and launch them against victim sites. Thus, while attack tools 
have become more sophisticated, they have also become easier to use. 
Destruction, 
Activism, 
Recreation 
Criminal groups  
Organized crime groups are using spam, phishing, and spyware/malware 
to commit identity theft and online fraud.  
Financial 
advantage 
Foreign intelligence 
services  
Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of their information 
gathering and espionage activities.  
Espionage, Enable 
future attacks 
Insiders  
The disgruntled insider is a principal source of computer crime. Insiders 
may not need a great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions 
because their knowledge of a target system often allows them to gain 
unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to steal system data. 
Financial 
advantage, 
Revenge 
Hostile 
Governments 
Several nations are aggressively working to develop information warfare 
doctrines, programs, and capabilities. Such capabilities enable a single 
entity to have a significant and serious impact by disrupting the supply, 
communications, and economic infrastructures that support military 
power–impacts that could affect the daily lives of U.S. citizens.  
Espionage, 
Warfare 
Terrorists  
Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical infrastructures to 
threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken the U.S. 
economy, and damage public morale and confidence.  
Ideology 
Industrial Spies  
Industrial espionage seeks to acquire intellectual property and know-how 
by clandestine methods  
Financial 
advantage 
 
A threat may be known to exist, but not significant.  For instance, a company may know 
of industrial spies targeting them from a competitor, but the company may deem the threat as 
non-existent for specific portions of their infrastructure.  For example, risk analysis may reveal 
that an outlying control station that is operating with 20 year old technology is not a likely target.  
It is unlikely that the competition would target this facility.  Assigning additional security 
resources to the remote control station is unwarranted.  Therefore, in order to properly assign 
resources, the severity of the threat must be determined.   
Severity of Adversarial threat 
Some industry experts speculate that since SCADA systems are typically custom made 
for specific sector applications, that it requires a great deal of specific knowledge on a particular 
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system and the specific industry in order to attack it.  Furthermore, that the “specialized 
knowledge” requirement will limit the number of attackers perhaps explains why SCADA 
attacks are not nearly as common as attacks on other computer networks (Chikuni and Dondo, 
2007).  Although successful SCADA attacks are infrequent to date, there are indications of 
increased interest by adversaries.  In 2002, U.S. investigators found evidence on browser logs 
showing Al-Qaeda operatives spending time on sites that offer programming for switches that 
run critical infrastructures (Gellman, 2002).  Also, during interrogations, Al-Qaeda prisoners 
have expressed the organizations interest in targeting critical infrastructures (Gellman, 2002).   
In September 2009, McAfee conducted a survey of critical infrastructure IT executives in 
fourteen countries (Baker et al., 2010).  The 600 respondents were asked a number of questions, 
such as „How long before you expect a major cyber incident affecting critical infrastructures in 
your country?‟ and „Are current laws in your country insufficient against cyber attacks?‟  Two 
figures in the survey were particularly telling.  Figure 4 shows the percentage of respondents that 
believe that foreign governments have been involved in cyber attacks against critical 
infrastructure in their country.  The largest responder was China with 75 percent.  The lowest 
was Spain with 42 percent.  The United States responded with 60 percent.  The vast majority 
believe that foreign governments are already attacking their critical infrastructures.   
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Figure 4. Suspected Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure (Baker et al., 2010) 
 
Another significant graph, Figure 5, from the McAfee study describes the percentage of 
large scale Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that selected countries have 
experienced and their frequencies.  Of the 13 countries listed on the graph 12 countries indicated 
that they experience DDoS attacks daily.  Approximately 55 percent of the respondents reported 
large scale DDoS at least annually.  However, these DDoS attacks only resulted in a damage to 
reputation, service interruption, or critical breakdown 23 percent of the time overall (Baker et al., 
2010).  These responses indicate that the adversary threat against critical infrastructure is high. 
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Figure 5. Suspected Large Scale DDoS Attacks and Frequency (Baker et al., 2010) 
 
Although there are similarities between IP networks and SCADA systems, there are 
significant differences in the negative impact that results when these systems are successfully 
attacked by an adversary.  For example an interruption to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) will 
typically result in a loss of revenue to customers.  However, a similar interruption to a SCADA 
system could cause the loss of proprietary information, damage to the economy, damage to the 
environment and potentially significant loss of life (Stouffer et al., 2008). 
IT systems connected to the Internet get attacked frequently.  According to the DoD, their 
computer networks are scanned and probed by external parties millions of times per day 
(CBS/AP, 2009).  These reconnaissance activities usually precede attacks.  According to the 
Carnegie-Mellon's Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) there 
were 7,236 Computer system/IP vulnerabilities reported in 2007 and 44,074 vulnerabilities 
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reported since they started keeping statistics in 1995 (Carnegie-Mellon CERT, 2010).  Since 
1998, the number of incidents reported to CERT/CC has increased significantly.  Figure 6 shows 
the number of reported incidents for the years 1990 through Q3 2003 for IP systems (Carnegie-
Mellon CERT, 2010).  The CERT/CC also notes that computer intrusion incidents are 
underreported.  For instance, some businesses may not want system hacks known publically, 
because it could damage their reputation and result in the loss of current and future customers.  
The trend for increasing incidents shows no sign of slowing.  The Internet grew by 380 percent 
from the year 2000 to 2009 and new vulnerabilities are routinely discovered (Internet World 
Stats, 2010).  As the Internet continues to grow, so does the attack surface, making yet more 
incidents possible. 
 
 
Figure 6. Information Security Incidents: 1990–2001 (Carnegie-Mellon, 2010) 
 
Year 
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A handful of incidents occurred where critical infrastructures were negatively impacted.  
The British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) tracks network security incidents that 
directly impact ICS and SCADA systems in their database (Byres et al., 2003).  The BCIT 
estimate there are approximately 100 cyber related incidents per year (Hildick-Smith, 2005).  
According to the BCIT Industrial Security Incident Database for the year 2004, there was a sharp 
increase in the number of incidents reported annually starting in 2001.  Figure 7 shows the 
Industrial Security Incidents from 1982 through 2006 as recorded in the BCIT.   
 
 
Figure 7. Industrial Security Incidents by Year (Stouffer et al., 2008) 
 
Additionally, prior to 2001, 70 percent of the attacks originated from insiders.  From 2001 
forward, there was a notable shift with 70 percent of the attacks originating from external sources 
(Byres and Lowe, 2004).  This shift in attack origin is likely due to increased connectivity of 
SCADA networks to the Internet, thus dramatically increasing the attack surface of these 
systems.  As of September 2009, it is estimated that 80 percent of critical infrastructure operators 
connect their SCADA systems to an IP network despite the security risks (Baker et al., 2010).  A 
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determined individual with an internet connection, phone line, or wireless connection could 
attack SCADA systems and cause damage.  Recent history provides numerous examples of 
attacks against SCADA systems running across the threat spectrum from teenage recreational 
hacker, to terrorist, to disgruntled insider. 
Recent SCADA attacks 
 The preponderance of malicious cyber attacks have occurred on non-SCADA computer 
networks.  The numbers of reported and verified malicious attacks against SCADA systems are 
small when compared to attacks against computer networks.  One problem in verifying malicious 
SCADA attacks is the difficulty of establishing attribution of the act to the attacker (Stouffer et 
al., 2008).  In recent years many malicious cyber attacks against SCADA systems worldwide 
have caused significant monetary cost.  The following are a number of impressive examples of 
SCADA related utility outages.  Although some were caused by acts of nature, or accidents, they 
are instructive of the effects that are possible by attacking critical infrastructures. 
1. 1997, Worcester Air Traffic Communications - In 1997, a juvenile accessed the phone 
system operated by New York – New England Telephone Company (NYNEX).  As a 
result the telephone service was disrupted to the Federal Aviation Administration Tower 
at the Worcester Airport, to the Worcester Airport Fire Department and to other related 
entities.  Additionally, aircraft were unable to send an electronic signal to activate the 
runway lights on approach.  Telephone service, including the 911 service, was also 
disabled throughout the local area (Stouffer et al., 2008). 
2. 1999, Bellingham Washington Gas Pipeline rupture - In June 1999 a steel gas pipeline 
ruptured near Bellingham Washington, killing two children and an 18 year old, injuring 
eight others and causing $45 million in property damage.  There were numerous 
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contributing factors to the accident including a SCADA system that became unresponsive 
allowing pressure to build up beyond safety parameters.  The National Transportation 
Safety board concluded that if the SCADA system operated correctly the rupture would 
not have happened (Carmody et al., 2002).   
3. 2000,  Maroochy Shire sewage control system - The Maroochy Shire, Queensland 
computerized waste management system was hacked into by a disgruntled former 
employee and caused millions of liters of raw sewage to spill out into local parks, rivers 
and the grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel.  The attack was conducted by an employee of 
the subcontractor that installed the SCADA system and was later turned down for job 
with the local government.  He accessed the network through a wireless connection.  The 
cost of the incident was estimated at greater than $1 million (Smith, 2001). 
4. 2003, Ohio Davis-Besse nuclear power plant - The Slammer worm penetrated a private 
computer network at Ohio‟s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in January 2003 and 
disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours and a plant process computer 
for six hours.  The worm gained entry through a T1 line that bypassed the business 
network firewall.  The nuclear power plant was offline at the time and both systems had 
redundant analog backups that were unaffected (Poulsen, 2003).   
5. 2003, Northeast Blackout - On August 14, 2003, the largest power blackout in North 
American history affected an area with an estimated 50 million people and 61,800 mega-
watts (MW) of electric load in the states of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey, and the Canadian province of 
Ontario.  The series of events that contributed to the blackout started with a failure of an 
alarm processor in First Energy‟s SCADA system.  A short time later multiple high 
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voltage lines in Ohio tripped due to contact with trees.  This caused overloading of 
additional high voltage lines which led to eventual failure of the power grid.  The 
blackout left some parts of the country without power for up to 4 days.  The estimated 
cost to the U.S. ranged between $4 billion and $10 billion (Liscouski et al., 2003).   
6. 2003, DoS attack on an Israeli power plant - Iranian hackers attempted to hack into the 
Israel Electric Corporation's computers and launch a denial of service attack to disrupt the 
power supply in Israel.  The attackers were foiled before any damage was inflicted 
(Yamini, 2003).  
7. 2003, CSX train service outage - In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus brought down 
train signaling systems throughout the east coast of the U.S.  The virus infected the 
computer system at CSX Corporation‟s Jacksonville, Florida headquarters, shutting down 
signaling, dispatching and other systems.  This caused a number of train cancellations 
and delays of long distance trains ranging from four to six hours (Hancock, 2003).   
8. 2005, Taum Sauk Dam Failure – The dam was overtopped during a night time pump-
back operation.  More than 1 billion gallons of water were released when the Dam failed.  
The overtopping was caused in large part due to improperly secured sensors that reported 
false water levels to the SCADA operators (King and Calcagno, 2010).   
Although not all of these mishaps were caused by a malicious party, it is clear from the 
recent history that the consequences of utility interruptions are significant.  An attacker with 
sufficient motivation and knowledge could conduct a devastating attack against critical 
infrastructures resulting in tremendous financial loss as well as the potential for loss of life.   
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Attack Countermeasures 
In order for a cyber attack to succeed, an attacker, vulnerability and a means of exploiting 
the vulnerability must exist.  If one or more of these don‟t exist then a successful attack is 
unlikely.  An attacker is also referred to as a threat.  From a defensive standpoint it is very 
difficult to eliminate a threat.  Likewise exploits built to take advantage of vulnerabilities are 
beyond the influence of defenders.  SCADA systems defenders install countermeasures like IA 
controls in order to mitigate known vulnerabilities (Stouffer et al., 2008).  So, the primary factor 
under the control of the SCADA systems operators is making their systems defensively strong 
through countermeasures like implementing IA controls.  According to MacAfee (2010), basic 
security measures are not widely adopted by critical infrastructures around the world.  It 
describes a basic security measures adoption rate ranging from 62 percent on the high end to 40 
percent on the low end (MacAfee, 2010).  Also, the sector with the highest adoption rate was 
banking and energy and the lowest water/sewage (MacAfee, 2010).  DOD security measure 
adoption rates are likely higher across all sectors due to directive regulations, but objective data 
was not available to support this assertion.  The next section describes future trends in SCADA 
systems.   
Future Trends 
The spectrum of threats to SCADA systems will continue to evolve.  Terrorist groups and 
governments will continue to refine their tools, techniques and procedures (TTP) for targeting 
SCADA systems.  Governments will increasingly recognize that cyber attacks against SCADA 
systems are an evolving area of warfare and national influence.  China is currently investing 
considerable effort into developing its cyber capabilities.  The Chinese government has also 
engaged in rhetoric toward other countries about their ability to adversely affect critical 
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infrastructures by cyber means.  There have been numerous cases in the recent past of Chinese 
hackers breaking into U.S. government systems.  As part of their military evolution, China is 
seeking to achieve electronic dominance over its global competitors by the year 2050 (Coughlin, 
2010). 
 Governments have three main challenges regarding the protection of critical 
infrastructures.  They must modify governmental organization structure to properly handle cyber 
threats, find effective ways to share sensitive threat and vulnerability information, and deploy 
capabilities to assist critical infrastructures for their common defense (Baker et al., 2010).   
 As the interest in SCADA systems increases, additional vulnerabilities will be discovered 
over time.  Safeguarding SCADA systems to ensure the functioning of the government, the 
economy and society will continue as a core area of concern with the U.S. government.  The 
pursuit of SCADA systems security will continue to grow.  Since SCADA systems are 
increasingly connected to other networks, ease with which exploits are built against SCADA 
systems will increase as well.  The future is ripe for discovering new vulnerabilities and 
exploitation of SCADA systems.   
Related Research 
In Mendezllovet‟s (2010) work titled “Codifying Information Assurance Controls for 
DOD SCADA Systems”, the primary goal of the research was to compare and map IA controls 
from the NIST SP 800-82 to the DOD IA Control framework.  The primary tool in 
Mendezllovet‟s research was a survey from Civil Engineer SMEs.  A relative ranking was 
produced within the three categories of Management, Operational and Technical IA controls.  
Additionally, respondents strongly favored four of the eight new IA controls they considered for 
potential inclusion into DOD regulations.  This research in evaluating the effectiveness of IA 
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controls may also provide additional insight into disconnects identified in Mendezllovet‟s (2010) 
research.  For example, in his research, Civil Engineer (CE) SMEs rated Certification and 
Accreditation low as a management control and rated encryption high as a technical control.  
Both of these issues were identified as out of synch with published information security 
guidance.  These potential touch points are examined in the conclusion of this research.  
In Igure‟s (2007) doctoral thesis, a taxonomy of security vulnerabilities in SCADA 
protocols, he addressed the problem of security assessment of SCADA communication 
protocols.  He used known SCADA protocol vulnerabilities to construct a taxonomy that 
provides a method for security assessment of other SCADA protocols.  As part of future work he 
suggested that his research could support the effort to find relative risks of the various 
vulnerabilities of the system.  The paths of his taxonomy could be assigned numeric values.  
These relative values would provide a risk grading on individual attacks and vulnerabilities 
(Igure, 2007).  This research will use a different tool in a similar manner as described by Igure in 
order to determine security effectiveness of groupings of IA controls against a specific category 
of attack and attack vector.  This will also give a partial ranking of a group of IA controls.   
Byres et al. (2004) describe the application of an attack tree methodology to a common 
SCADA protocol.  The goal is to use the attack tree as a method to assess the security risks in the 
protocol to identify flaws that could cause damage to the SCADA system.  The authors 
developed 15 attacker goals, then built attack trees.  They speculated that since there is very little 
security inherent in SCADA protocols that any moderately skilled hacker would be able attack 
the system if access is achieved.  They made a number of important observations that are directly 
applicable to this research.  Attackers typically engage in reconnaissance activity prior to 
launching an attack.  Also, the clear precursor to a cyber attack is gaining network access to the 
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target system.  The team of authors believe that the technical difficulty is the most critical 
indictor of attack success.  Lastly, the authors suggested as future work an approach that better 
aggregates attack tree subordinate node values and site specific parameters such as known 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures.  This research will address a portion of Byres et al (2004) 
future work by incorporating an aggregation of subordinate leaf node values and IA control site 
specific countermeasures into the attack tree.   
Logistics Compliance Assessment Program  
The Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP) is an evaluation program to 
ensure units key logistics processes are performed in a safe, standardized, repeatable and 
technically compliant manner.  In the Air Force, Major Commands (MAJCOMs) conduct LCAP 
evaluations of subordinate units to assess their logistics proficiency.  Air Force Instruction 20-
111, Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP) standardizes the breadth, depth, 
frequency, grading, and reporting requirements (Reno, 2009).  The LCAP applies to AF units 
performing duties across the spectrum of logistics to include fuels operations.  Acceptable 
quality levels are used to minimize subjectivity in LCAP evaluations and describe allowed 
discrepancies.  LCAP functional checklists are developed by AF/A4L in coordination with 
MAJCOMs.  The checklists serve as a guide for inspectors in assessing logistics units (Reno, 
2009).  The AFMC Fuels Management LCAP checklist was reviewed in order to glean aspects of 
the operation which are vulnerable to a cyber attack.  The following items may be susceptible to 
cyber attack:  accuracy of inventory, proper documentation of inspections and procedures, 
documentation of training, certifications and qualifications, operational checklists and fuels 
operating Instructions.   
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Stuxnet 
In June 2010, a complex computer worm was discovered which effectively disabled 
Iran‟s nuclear program for more than a year.  Later this worm was given the name Stuxnet.  It is 
suspected that the worm initially propagated from thumb drives that were carried by personnel 
from one computer to another, even broaching Iranian air gapped systems.  For almost 17 
months, Stuxnet targeted a specific Siemens centrifuge control component to moderate the speed 
at which the nuclear facilities‟ centrifuges rotated in order to damage, but not destroy them 
(Barnes, 2010).  The worm is also capable of masking its own actions, making troubleshooting 
for the root cause extremely difficult.  Even though the Iranians are aware that their systems are 
infected with the worm and have spent substantial resources in cleaning-up, the worm is so 
virulent that they continue to be plagued by it (Barnes, 2010).   
Stuxnet uses a digitally signed kernel-mode rootkit.  It has approximately 4,000 functions 
which is comparable to some commercial software products (ICS-CERT, 2010).  Stuxnet takes 
advantage of 4 zero day exploits.  Two of the zero days have since been patched.  It also uses the 
same exploit as the Conficker worm (ICS-CERT, 2010).  It appears that a thumb drive is the 
primary means of propagation, but the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response 
Team (ICS-CERT) has noted that it can also spread via network shares, STEP7 Project files, 
WinCC database files, and a print spooler vulnerability (ICS-CERT, 2010).  As of October 2010, 
Symantec estimates that over 100,000 computers are infected with Stuxnet worldwide, with 60% 
of those infections in Iran (Jarema, 2010).   
Computer experts at Microsoft who examined the worm estimate that it took 10,000 man-
hours to build.  Others conclude that it must have been developed by a nation state due to its 
sophistication and ability to target very specialized proprietary vendor equipment (Barnes, 2010).  
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Experts have a long way to go to discover all of the intricacies of the exploit as reverse 
engineering work continues.  The Stuxnet worm is an interesting and relevant real-world exploit 
to choose as part of this research.  
NIST IA Controls 
The purpose of NIST SP 800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, is 
to provide guidance for securing ICS, SCADA systems, DCS, and other systems performing 
control functions in critical infrastructure operations.  It recommends security countermeasures 
via a list of many different methods and techniques for securing SCADA systems in order to 
mitigate associated risks.  The guide encourages readers to perform a risk-based assessment on 
their systems and to tailor the recommended guidelines and solutions to meet their specific 
security, business and operational requirements (Stouffer et al., 2008).  Security controls are 
defined as the management, operation, and technical safeguards and countermeasures identified 
to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and system (Katzke et 
al. 2006).  The 30 IA controls as described in NIST SP 800-82 are listed in Table 7.  These 
security controls will be incorporated into the attack tree described later in Chapter 3.   
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Table 7.  ICS Security Controls (Stouffer et al., 2008) 
Management Controls 
Risk Assessment 
Planning 
System and Service Acquisition 
Certification, Accreditation, and Security 
Assessments 
Operational Controls 
Personnel Security 
Physical and Environmental Protection 
Control Center/Control Room 
Portable Devices 
Cabling 
Contingency Planning 
Disaster Recovery Planning 
Configuration Management 
System and Information Integrity 
Malicious Code Detection 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
Patch Management 
Media Protection 
Incident Response 
Awareness and Training 
Technical Controls 
Identification and Authentication 
Password Authentication 
Physical Token Authentication 
Role-Based Access Control 
Web Servers 
Virtual Local Area Network 
Dial-up Modems 
Wireless 
Audit and Accountability 
Encryption 
Virtual Private Network 
 
Different critical infrastructure operations may implement only a subset of the IA 
controls.  Depending on the degree to which the ICS is integrated into the operation, 
implementation of some IA controls is not possible.  For instance, if an operation does not 
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possess any portable devices then the operational control for portable devices is not 
implemented.   
Fault Trees 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a tool used for safety and reliability evaluations to analyze 
and visually display failure paths in a system.  It provides a means for systems level risk 
evaluations via a tree structure (Ericson, 1999).  FTA is about 50 years old as of this writing and 
is widely used around the world.  The failure behavior of the system is modeled in a visual fault 
tree.  The simple set of logic rules and symbols within the tree structure make qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation of very complex systems possible (Ericson, 1999).  The construction of 
fault trees is simple, but Ericson (1999) warns that if the tree becomes too complex, they become 
much more difficult to solve.  He states that the ability to evaluate is directly related to fault tree 
size, complexity and computer capacity.  It‟s important to briefly discuss fault trees as the 
precursor from which attack trees evolved.  Attack trees take advantage of all of the features of 
fault trees plus additional capabilities.   
Attack Trees 
Attack trees, just like fault trees are models of reality (Ericson, 1999).  They provide a 
simplified representation of complex real world drivers.  The accuracy underlying the drivers and 
future analysis depend on time/effort spent studying them and assumptions made.   
In an attack tree, the attacks against the target are represented by an upside down tree 
structure with the goal as the root node and different ways of achieving that goal as sub-goals 
and leaf nodes as the lowest level tasks (Schneier, 1999).  The leaf nodes contain user-definable 
values called indicator values to store attributes of that leaf node.  It is possible to assign multiple 
user-defined variables in the form of Boolean, continuous, or explicitly specified values to the 
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leaf nodes.  For instance, a Boolean value could take the form of breach of trust, either true or 
false, a continuous value such as cost, from zero to potentially millions of dollars and explicitly 
specified values such as 1 for low to 4 for high.  There are many other possibilities for 
continuous node values to include, but not limited to - technical difficulty, technical ability, 
noticeability, impact of attack, probability of apprehension, likelihood of attack success, site 
conditions and installed countermeasures (Byres, 2004).  This research uses, in part, publically 
available attack data as a source to populate indicator values in the attack tree.  For a large attack 
tree there can be thousands of potential attack scenarios if all possible paths are followed in order 
to read the root goal.  In order to narrow down the number of attacks to better match the potential 
threat, a threat agent profile is applied to the tree.  In the SecureITree software a threat agent 
profile defines the capabilities of the attacker.  The threat agent profile is user defined with 
operators on the indicator values which describe the capabilities and limitations of the specific 
attacker, thus reducing the number of potential paths that are available to reach the root goal 
(Ingoldsby, 2010).   
The attack tree includes both physical and cyber attacks for completeness.  It shows the 
touch points between the two and how they affect one-another.  Additionally, it highlights the 
mutually exclusive physical and cyber aspects of possible attacks.  Just like fault trees, if the 
attack tree becomes too complex, the utility is lost.  Therefore, only cyber attacks are evaluated 
in this research.  Also to ensure the tree is not too complex, the lowest level tasks are kept at a 
course level of description.  For instance, the low level task of “searching the Internet” for target 
information could include the sub-task of accessing the Internet, navigating to Google, 
navigating to target website, etc….  However, the task is left as “searching the Internet” for 
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better utility.  The tasks are broken down to the point where further subdividing them does not 
contribute to the overall research effort to reveal the IA control system security effectiveness. 
Attack trees are compelling tools for a number of reasons.  Attack trees provide a 
methodical way of describing the security of systems, based on varying attacks and attacker 
profiles (Schneier, 1999).  The use of attack trees allows the comparison of technical and non-
technical attacks which leads to a more comprehensive analysis of threats and vulnerabilities 
(Franz et al., 2004).  They also capture knowledge in a reusable form and are scalable, so the 
creator does not need to be an expert in everything (Schneier, 1999).  Attack trees also focus 
analysis on measureable goals that can ultimately be translated into specific tests against real 
world implementations (Byres, 2004).  For instance if an organization experienced significant 
financial loss over a period of time due to physical theft of property, they may develop the goal 
of reducing financial loss due to theft.  The use of an attack tree can reveal specific areas to 
further develop security courses of action in order to reduce the likelihood of theft and thus 
reduce future financial loss.  Attack trees also allow for a structured elaboration of events in 
order for an attack to be successful (Byres, 2004).  These distinctive capabilities of attack trees 
make the tool well suited to answer security related questions.  
Limitations of Attack Trees 
There are a number of disadvantages to attack trees.  The main disadvantage of attack 
trees is that they provide only the choice between and/or nodes.  This limits the ways a goal can 
be broken down into sub-goals (Buhan, Bazen, Hartel & Veldhuis, 2006).  Another limitation is 
that attack trees may not consider secondary factors.  For instance, a robust insider threat 
monitoring program may catch a malicious insider and prevent an incident.  Also, a realistic 
estimation of the indicator values at the leaf node level is difficult to get exactly right (Opel, 
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2005).  Additionally, it may be difficult to break the leaf node actions into totally independent 
steps (Piètre-Cambacédès & Bouissou, 2010).  Lastly, the creation of a complete Attack Tree is 
virtually impossible.  They can give a false sense of security.  Some attack vectors may be 
overlooked.  It is always limited by the skills and depth of knowledge of the creator (Opel, 
2005).  Although attack trees have limitations, they have numerous characteristics which make 
them well suited for modeling purposes in this research.   
Attack Tree Modeling Software 
Modeling software can significantly assist in the creation and enumeration of attack trees.  
SecureITree software was purchased by AFIT in order to facilitate research in the Center for 
Cyberspace Research (CCR).  This software provides the capability to model attack trees in a 
visual manner.  It further incorporates the application of various indicator values to the leaf 
nodes.  Additional operations are available to analyze attack scenarios, threat agents, risk, and 
allows the propagation of indicator values up the tree.  An example of an attack tree with the root 
goal called Root is displayed in Figure 8.  In order for an AND node to be true, all subordinate 
leaf nodes must be true.  Conversely for an OR node to be true, only one of the subordinate leaf 
nodes need be true.  Finally, since the root node is the ultimate goal of the attacker, the indicators 
associated with it reflect the resources required to compromise the system (Byres, 2004). 
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Figure 8. Example Attack Tree 
 
Oil and Gas Pipeline sector 
The specific critical infrastructure for this research is fuels operations, which is part of 
the oil and gas pipeline sector.  This is a high interest area for the government and military.  
Access to petroleum and its associated operations are literally the fuel that enables war and 
drives modern civilization.  This sector was chosen due to existing research efforts supported by 
HQ AF A4/A7 and an established relationship between the CCR and the local WPAFB fuels 
flight.  The local fuels operation was utilized as the foundation of the attack tree model and 
appropriate NIST SP 800-82 IA controls were incorporated.   
Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided a summary of the current state of critical infrastructure control 
systems protection and exploitation.  The compelling cost and operational benefits continues to 
drive increased connectivity of control systems to corporate networks.  This increased 
connectivity also increases the attack surface of control systems.  It is highly probable that 
motivated adversaries will attack SCADA systems.  Since critical infrastructure owners and 
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operators worldwide are seeing increased attack activity, governments are eager to partner with 
private entities to ensure their continued function.   
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"I am tempted to make a slightly exaggerated statement: that logistics is all of war-making, 
except shooting the guns, releasing the bombs, and firing the torpedoes." 
- ADM Lynde D. McCormick, USN 
 
 
III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes the research methodology for the IA control system security 
effectiveness effort.  It describes the approach, data sources, building the attack tree, 
understanding probability, and limitations.  It concludes with a brief outline of how results are 
interpreted in the data analysis chapter.   
Introduction 
This research will provide insight into which IA controls are most significant for network 
defenders and SCADA systems operators to focus on in order to ensure the security of critical 
infrastructures against a Stuxnet-like exploit.  Since the attack vector is the most advanced 
exploit found to date against critical infrastructure, this research is timely to identify those 
critical IA controls which are most effective in mitigating a successful attack.   
Approach 
This study continues the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) AF/A4/7 – Logistics, 
Installations & Mission Support sponsored research effort into critical infrastructure protection.  
A portion of the framework in Risk Assessment section of NIST 800-30, Risk Management 
Guide for Information Technology Systems is used to develop a Risk Level Matrix and then 
recommend particular IA controls.  The Likelihood determination, step five of the guide, is 
developed via a cyber attack tree modeled on the WPAFB fuels operation.  The attack tree is 
generated from operator checklists, annual rate of occurrence from significant mission impacting 
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events, the NIST IA controls, existing survey data and direct researcher observation of 
operations.  Next, a meaningful way to represent the probability of attacker success is 
determined.  It will then be used to develop the probability values related to IA controls and 
individual attacker actions which culminate in an overall probability of adversary success.  Then 
an analysis is performed on the paths an attacker can take in order to achieve the overall goal and 
five specific, different attack scenarios are chosen.  The attack scenarios will allow the attacker 
to produce specific adverse impacts against the SCADA system.  Next an impact analysis, step 6 
of the guide, is performed to determine the adverse impact resulting from a successful attack.  
The impact analysis data is obtained via a survey instrument of six WPAFB Fuels SMEs.  Then a 
risk determination, step 7 of the guide, is made using the SME responses along with the 
probability of adversary success to develop a risk matrix.  Finally the risk matrix will point to the 
group of IA controls which most significantly contributes to system security against a Stuxnet-
like cyber attack, producing the IA control recommendations, step 8 of the guide.   
Understanding Probability of Adversary Success 
Attack trees are particularly useful in estimating the risk for situations where the event 
happens infrequently or has not occurred before.  Attack trees greatly improve risk estimation by 
incorporating not only knowledge of the defender‟s system, but also the adversary that will 
attack it.  Risk is an expression of the likelihood that a threat actor will exploit a vulnerability of 
a target (Byres, 2004).   
 Ingoldsby (2010) identifies a number of different types of risk that are expressed as 
equations in the SecureITree software.  The various types of risk include attack risk, attack 
scenario relative risk, absolute risk, probabilistic risk, capitalistic risk, and total risk.  All of the 
risk calculations in the SecureITree software require subjective input from the user.  In an effort 
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to reduce the amount of subjective data introduced into this research, it was desirable to seek 
another way to calculate risk that was more objective.  Ayyub, McGill & Kaminsky (2007) 
introduced an equation to describe risk with only three variables.  The probability of adversary 
success, Ps is described as one minus the system security effectiveness (1 - Es), multiplied by 
both the probability of attack success, Pk and the probability distribution of hazard intensity 
imparted on the target, Q.  This equation, Ps = (1 - Es) Pk  Q, is used as the starting point and 
modified in order to arrive at an equation to describe the overall probability of adversary success 
of a specific cyber attack using the attack tree.  The equation is reduced by recognizing that Q 
has no meaning at the task level.  The expression of the hazard intensity only has meaning at the 
root node of the cyber attack tree where all of the sub-tasks come together and the effect of the 
attack takes place.  For this research Q will be held at the value of 1.  The modified equation 
describing the probability of adversary success is Ps = (1 - Es) Pk. 
The above equation describes the probability of adversary success for a specific leaf node 
action with one IA control applied.  Therefore the total probably of adversary success for a 
specific leaf node, Pleaf, with multiple IA controls applied is represented as the sum of all of the 
Ps‟s, divided by n, the number of IA controls which impact the particular leaf node, see Figure 9.   
 
Figure 9. Probability of Adversary success for specific leaf node 
 
Next, it is necessary to calculate the probability at each of the OR and AND nodes below 
the root node.  The probability is calculated as the average of the leaf nodes for an AND node.  
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OR node probabilities are calculated as the minimum of its leaf nodes.  These probability rules 
then propagate up the tree to the root node.  Finally the probability generated at the root node is 
the overall probability of adversary success for a specific attack scenario.   
Method for Creating Attack Tree 
In order to build an effective attack tree, it is desirable to follow a methodical, structured 
process in an iterative manner to guide thought.  Schneier provides a straightforward method for 
creating an attack tree (Schneier, 1999).  The steps are displayed graphically in Figure 10 and 
outlined below as follows:   
Steps to Create an Attack Tree 
1.  Identify possible attack goals 
2.  Form a separate tree for each goal, they may share subtrees or leaf nodes 
3.  Brainstorm attacks against each goal 
4.  Add these attacks to the tree 
5.  Repeat steps 3 and 4 until tree is complete 
6.  Give to someone else for review/additions 
7.  Add to/refine tree as necessary over time 
Creating 
an 
Attack Tree
1. Identify 
Possible 
Attack Goals
2. Form a 
separate 
tree for 
each Goal
3. Brainstorm 
attacks 
against each 
Goal
4. Add 
these 
attacks to 
the tree
6. Give to 
someone else 
for 
review/additions
Complete 
Attack Tree
7.  Add 
to/refine tree 
over time
Start
End
5. Repeat 
until 
complete
 
Figure 10. Creating an Attack Tree (Schneier, 1999) 
  
52 
Data Collection 
 
In order to ensure the attack tree is as thorough and complete as possible, a number of 
source documents are utilized to assist in its construction.   
- Fuels flight operating instructions 
- Quality checklists (QCL) 
- Inspector General inspection results 
- Various DoD and AF level petroleum regulations 
- Fuels Manager Defender documentation  
- Direct observations of fuels flight operation 
- Amenaza SecureITree software references 
- NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 3, Recommended Security Controls for 
Federal Information Systems and Organizations 
- NIST SP 800-82, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security 
- NIST SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems 
 
The broad variety of sources and their thoughtful consideration used to create the attack 
tree ensures it is sufficiently complete.   
Building the Attack Tree 
In this research, the attack tree root goal is to cause a disruption of fuels operations.  The 
result of a successful attack makes it possible for the attacker to deny, degrade, destroy, disrupt, 
deceive or delay aspects of the fuels operation.  Potential threat agents against critical 
infrastructure include the broad categories:  natural, accidental and malicious (Bundbury, 2009).  
The variation in potential threat agent attacks against critical infrastructure is expansive, running 
the gambit from teenage hacker, nation state actor, industrial accidents, terrorist attacks, 
disgruntled employee, and hurricane to heat wave and points in between.  This research focuses 
on those attacks that are believed most common.  According to MacAfee (2010), more than half 
of the executives surveyed said they had experienced large scale denial of service attacks and 
“stealthy infiltration” by a high level adversary like organized crime, or a nation state against 
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their critical infrastructure operation.  Furthermore, fifty-nine percent of those surveyed believe 
that foreign governments had already been involved in attacks and infiltrations in their countries 
(Baker et al., 2010).  Additionally the computer experts reverse engineering the Stuxnet worm 
suspect the worm was generated by a nation state (Barnes, 2010).  The prevailing belief is that 
attacks on critical infrastructures by a well-organized nation state adversary with specific goals 
are common.  Additionally, according to Byres (2004), 70 percent of the security incidents on 
critical infrastructures were from an external source during the years of 2001-2003.  The 
majority of those attacks, 51 percent originated remotely via the Internet.  Therefore, for this 
research the primary threat agent applied to the attack tree is a sophisticated, wealthy, remote and 
anti-social adversary.  The adversary is highly technically competent and has substantial 
resources at their disposal.  Lastly, the threat agent only attacks remotely and does not engage in 
physical attacks, nor social engineering.  
The major sub-trees of the attack tree was built using the cyber attack methodology 
outlined in the book Counter-Hack Reloaded as a base-line in order to capture all the steps which 
typically occur in a cyber attack (Skoudis & Liston, 2006).  Additionally, specific Stuxnet-
related vulnerabilities were incorporated consistent with those described in US-CERT and ICS-
CERT (2010).  The attack tree was ported to SecureITree software.  See Appendix B for the 
complete base stuxnet attack tree.   
Indicator Values 
The attack tree leaf nodes contain user-definable values called indicators to store 
characteristics of that leaf node.  The necessary indicator values were determined and each leaf 
node was assigned indicators values as shown in Table 8.   
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Table 8. Leaf node Indicator variables (Ingoldsby, 2010) 
Indicator Name Type Value Range 
Probability of adversary success Continuous 0..1 
System security effectiveness Continuous  0..1 
Probability of attack Success Continuous 0..1 
Technical Difficulty Specified 0 - Unlikely, .1 - Difficult, .5 - Moderate,                   
.9 - Trivial, 1 – None 
Physical presence Boolean T/F 
Breach of trust Boolean T/F 
 
Description of Indicator Values 
The following paragraphs describe the indicator values and how values were determined 
for specific leaf nodes.  The probability of adversary success was calculated as the values 
propagate up the tree.  All other calculations of indicator values were done outside of the 
SecureITree software.  See Appendix E for Indicator Value Summary. 
Probability of adversary success:  The probability of adversary success is the average 
of the probability of adversary successes as they propagate up the tree.  See Figure 9 for 
equation.  For a specific attack scenario there is only one overall probability of adversary 
success value at the root node.  The lower the value the less likely the adversary will be 
successful.   
System security effectiveness:  The system security effectiveness is the degree to which 
the IA control is effective in defending the system.  This value was obtained by 
extrapolating it from existing survey data.  See appendix G further explanation (Freyre et 
al., 2010).  The system security effectiveness value is the Es value in the equation 
described in Figure 9.  The larger the value, the more security the IA control provides for 
the system.   
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Probability of attack success:  The probability of attack success describes the 
probability that a particular leaf node action will be successful.  It equals the technical 
difficulty for that leaf node.  The lower this value, the lower the likelihood of attack 
success.  See Appendix H for Probability of Attack Success Matrix.  
Technical difficulty:  This indicator is used to determine the probability of attack 
success.  According to Byers (2004) the technical difficulty of an attack is the most 
critical indicator of attack success.  The higher the technical difficulty, the lower the 
probability of successful attack execution.  See Table 9 for enumeration of the different 
tiers of technical difficulty.  Objective data was not available to determine these values, 
therefore technical difficulty was determined and assigned by the researcher.  
Recognizing that the precise values of technical difficulty were not of critical importance, 
the researcher sought to assign values that were appropriate to the leaf node actions 
relative to each other.  An effort was made to ensure the values assigned were consistent 
with the Threat Likelihood scale provided in NIST 800-30, Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems, pg 25.   
Table 9. Description of Technical Difficulty (Byres, 2004) 
Technical Difficulty 
Name  Description  Value 
None No technical skill required 1 
Trivial  Little technical skill required .9 
Moderate Average cyber hacking skills required .5 
Difficult Demands a high degree of technical expertise .1 
Unlikely Beyond the known capability of today‟s best hackers 0 
Not Applicable Not Applicable - 
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Physical presence:  Physical presence is a Boolean indicator that describes the need for 
an attacker to be physically present at the target in order to accomplish the leaf node 
action.  If this indicator is false, then the action is executed remotely.  
Breach of trust:  Breach of trust is a Boolean indicator that describes the insider threat.  
If this value is true, then an insider is necessary for the leaf node action to succeed.  If the 
value is false, then an insider is not necessary for success.   
Associating IA Controls with Leaf node actions 
The leaf nodes of the attack tree and the IA controls were associated with each other via a 
matrix with the leaf node actions on the vertical and the IA controls listed horizontally.  Further, 
the values for the systems security effectiveness and technical difficulty where input.  See 
appendix H for Probability of attack success matrix.  The association of leaf node actions and IA 
controls were assigned as determined reasonable by the researcher.  The NIST 800-82, Guide to 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security was used as a source to assist in determining which IA 
controls are associated with the leaf node actions.  Where the IA control had influence over the 
leaf node action, a partial probability of adversary success was calculated at that junction.  For 
leaf nodes which were impacted by multiple IA controls, the average of the probability of 
adversary success was taken for that leaf node.  Additionally the IA controls associated with each 
leaf node were annotated in the notes section in SecureITree.   
The attack tree was passed to AFIT faculty and students who are knowledgeable in attack 
tree creation.  Step six of Figure 10 directs that the attack tree be given to someone else for 
review/additions.  The attack tree created for this research was provided to four AFIT faculty and 
a master‟s student who attended the SecureITree training to conduct a review for completeness.  
Two of the faculty instructors were cyber operations officers, each with over 18 years of 
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experience.  The third faculty member has been an instructor at AFIT for 7 years and a IT 
security professional for 25 years.  The fourth faculty member is a cyber security research 
engineer specializing in critical infrastructure.  The final reviewer was a master‟s student with 10 
years experience in Information Management who is also using an attack tree in his research.  
Following through with this step ensures that the attack tree captures a more complete picture of 
possible attacks and is rooted in operational reality.  Feedback was incorporated into the final 
attack tree going forward in the remainder of this research.   
Survey 
The purpose of the survey is to seek USAF fuels subject matter experts (SME) ranking of 
cyber incidents against the fuels Automated Information System (AIS).  This data, in conjunction 
with the probability of adversary success, will be used to determine which IA controls are most 
influential in securing the fuels AIS against a specific cyber attack.  It will be administered to six 
personnel who work in fuels operations/management.   
Population 
The target population is USAF Fuels subject matter experts (SMEs).  The sample was 
drawn from WPAFB Fuels flight personnel due to an existing research relationship.  Also HQ 
AFMC/A4RE  personnel were included due to proximity as targets of opportunity.  The 
personnel participating met the following criteria: 
 They possess extensive experience in fuels operations 
 They have fuels SCADA system experience 
 They volunteered to participate in the study 
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Survey Overview 
The survey instrument consists of three parts.  Part one consists of demographics which 
asks questions about years of experience, computer security/network security training, industry  
certifications and affiliation with the government.  Part two asks respondents  to assign an impact 
rating of low, medium or high to given incidents.  The definitions provided for  low, medium and 
high are derived from NIST SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems, pg. 23.  The respondents are rating the incidents in the right column of Table 10. 
Mapping of Vulnerability Leaf Nodes to Incidents.  Part three asks respondents to further refine 
each incident they ranked in Part two.  They are directed to consider all other incidents they can 
think of that fall within the same category and provide a value for the incident.  These values 
range from:  Low (1 to 10); Medium (11 to 50); High (51 to 100), derived from NIST SP 800-30, 
pg. 25.  See Appendix I for full survey instrument.   
 Table 10. Mapping of Vulnerability Leaf Nodes to Incidents 
Network Device Leaf Node  Stuxnet vulnerability Leaf node Effect 
Exploit vulnerable application Step 7 Project files 
Alter Fuels Manager Defense 
(FMD) database data            
Exploit vulnerable application Exploit Vulnerable WinCC 
Alter FMD real time Human-
Machine Interface (HMI) data    
Exploit vulnerable Windows 
XP Operating System 
Exploit Print Spooler vulnerability  
Cause the computer hard 
drive where FMD resides to 
crash 
Network Server Exploit vulnerable Server Service 
Transmit a false report to the 
Fuels Enterprise System 
Network Server 
Exploit Vulnerable Network 
Shares 
Disrupt FMD 
Communications 
 
Risk Matrix 
The purpose of the NIST 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems is to provide a structure for the development of an effective risk management program.  
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It provides descriptions and practical guidance needed for assessing and mitigating risks 
discovered within IT systems.  The ultimate goal of the guide is to assist organizations to better 
manage IT-related mission risks (Stoneburner et.al, 2002).  This guide contains recognized 
industry best practices and recommendations from NIST.  The risk matrix is obtained from NIST 
800-30, pg 25.  There is no comparable risk matrix currently available specifically for SCADA 
systems, so this information systems risk matrix is used.   
 The risk matrix combines the results obtained from the attack tree and the survey.  For 
the purposes of this research the threat likelihood is replaced with the probability of adversary 
success.  The verbiage is different, but they both describe the same thing, the probability that the 
overall adversary attack succeeds.  The values for the probability of adversary success are placed 
along the Y axis were threat likelihood is shown in Figure 11.  In a similar manner the SME 
impact from the survey is placed along the X axis on the risk matrix.  The resulting intersections 
will be plotted in a graph and analyzed in chapter 4.  The scale of the X and Y axis are pulled 
directly from NIST 800-30 without modification.  There is no need to deviate from the scale 
provided because it is a recognized guideline for best practices and fits well within the research 
methodology.   
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Figure 11. Risk Level Matrix (Stoneburner et al., 2002)   
 
Limitations of this approach 
Attack trees are subjective, because they reflect the thought process of their creator.  
Also, it holds true that “more heads are better than one” in building attack trees.  This ensures 
that there are differing individual thought processes applied to the same problem, resulting in a 
stronger tree.  The attack tree in this research was created by a single individual and validated by 
peer review.  The review made the tree stronger, but it may not be as robust as an attack tree 
generated by a group.  Also, data for the technical difficulty and probability of attack success 
were determined subjectively because objective data were not available.  Since there was no 
objective data there was no way to evaluate the underlying probably distribution.  Therefore, no 
assumption was made about the underlying probability distribution.  Also, the manner in which 
the probably of adversary success was propagate up the attack tree may not be optimal.  
Averaging the probabilities fit well into the risk level matrix management tool, but also likely 
smoothed out the probabilities which may skew the results.  Once again, objective data could 
shed additional light on a better way to propagate the probabilities up the tree.  Additionally, due 
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to the thousands of available attack scenarios within the tree, a small subset of specific attack 
scenarios were selected for examination consistent with available attack trend data.  As a 
consequence, potentially relevant data within those discarded scenarios are not included.  
Finally, inclusion of commercial proprietary data may make the attack tree applicable to a larger 
cross section of the critical infrastructure community.  But due to its sensitive nature, proprietary 
data was not available for this research.   
Data Analysis Procedure 
The methodology presented here utilizes an attack tree based on WPAFB fuels 
operations.  The probability of adversary success associated with each of the lowest level tasks 
contributes to the overall probability of adversary success of the specific attack.  The probability 
of adversary success will vary depending on which leaf node actions are taken to reach the root 
goal and their corresponding IA controls.  A survey of fuels operations SMEs provides the 
impact rating of specific incidents which are possible after a successful attack.  These impact 
ratings are then coupled with the earlier probability to develop the risk matrix.  The data points in 
the matrix will fall into one of nine quadrants, as in Figure 11.  By examining the data points in 
the matrix, it will reveal the most influential IA controls.  These IA controls will appear where 
the probability of adversary success is lowest.  Therefore, the most influential IA controls will 
fall into the lower portion of the matrix, meaning those defensive IA controls are most effective.   
Also, the further to the right on the impact axis, the more significant the impact of the event.  So, 
the closer to the lower right-hand portion of the matrix, the more significant the associated IA 
controls to reducing risk and increasing systems security.   
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided the methodology for determining the most significant IA controls 
to secure a fuel operation SCADA system against a specific cyber attack.  It described the data 
sources used to populate an attack tree based on a fuels operation.  The process of building the 
attack tree and narrowing down the IA controls associated with specific attacks is described.  
Then an equation describing probably of attack success was modified in a number of steps to get 
to the final equation to describe the probability of adversary success.  Next, potential limitations 
to this approach are addressed.  Finally, the data analysis procedure was described.  The next 
chapter describes the analysis of data. 
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IV. Data Analysis 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents an analysis of the survey data collected from the WPAFB fuels 
operations SMEs.  It also examines the probability of adversary success of the five specific 
attack scenarios.  Next, the probability of adversary success from the attack scenarios and the 
incident impact are combined into a risk matrix.  Finally, the risk matrix is analyzed to determine 
the most influential IA controls in securing the SCADA system.  
Survey  
Six members of the WPAFB fuels operation and HQ AFMC/A4RE were surveyed to 
obtain SME rankings on specified incident impacts for a cyber attack on the fuels operation.  The 
following paragraphs analyze and discuss the responses to the WPAFB fuels operations survey.  
See appendix I for the full survey instrument.   
Part I - Demographics 
There were four questions in the demographics section.  The first question asked how 
many years of experience does the respondent have in operating or managing fuels industrial 
control systems.  The respondents in the survey all had at least 11 years and the majority had 
over 21 years of experience, see Figure 12.   
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Figure 12. Years experience in Fuels Industrial Control Systems 
 
Question two asked for all computer security or network security training completed in 
the last five years.  Table 11 lists the Computer Security or Network Security Training 
respondents have received in the last five years.  Most of the respondents listed both Information 
Assurance Awareness and Information Protection training.  Only one respondent did not indicate 
Information Protection training.  This is likely an oversight, because it is a requirement in order 
to use the Air Force network.  Respondents did not indicate any additional training outside of 
annual AF training requirements.    
Table 11. Computer Security or Network Security Training in Last 5 Years 
 
1
1
4
Years experience in Fuels Industrial Control 
Systems
1-5 Years
6-10 Years
11-15 Years
16-20 Years
21 Years or more
Computer Security/Network Security Training Number
DoD Information Assurance Awareness 6
Information Protection 5
Total 11
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 Question three asked for a list of all industry certifications successfully completed in the 
last five years.  See Table 12 Industry certifications in last 5 years.  The low number of 
certifications is surprising.  One respondent had both the Level I and II Quality Assurance 
Certifications and another had a Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) 6.0 certification.  The Air Force 
requires quality assurance certifications in order to manage contracted operations.  Also, it makes 
sense a current fuels operator would have an FMD certification.  There were four out of the six 
respondents who listed no industry certifications in the last five years.  It may be the case that the 
respondents have additional certifications they obtained more than five years ago.   
Table 12. Industry Certifications in Last 5 Years 
 
 
 The final question asks respondents about their primary affiliation with the government.  
The respondents were evenly split with two civil servants, two military and two contractors.  See 
Figure 13 for Primary Affiliation with Government. 
 
Industry Certifications Number
Level I Quality Assurance Certification 1
Level II Quality Assurance Certification 1
Fuels Manager Defense 6.0 1
Total 3
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Figure 13. Primary Affiliation with Government 
  
Part II – Impact Rating 
 This section of the survey asked respondents to rate the impact magnitudes for the five 
incidents.  The incidents were rated as Low, Medium or High impact.  The definitions for these 
ratings were taken directly from NIST 800-30 Risk Management Guide for Information 
Technology systems, page 23.  The mode is also displayed for each incident.  See Table 13. 
Incident Impact Ratings.     
 
 
 
 
 
2
2
2
Primary affiliation with Government
Contractor
Military
Civil Service
Other
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Table 13. Incident Impact Ratings 
 
 
Part III – Impact Category refinement 
This section of the survey asked respondents to further score the incident impact within 
the rating they assigned in Part II.  Scores were assigned in the following guidelines:  Low 
impact (1 to 10), Medium impact (11 to 50), High impact (51 to 100).  Respondents were to take 
into account all other events that can occur in that magnitude of impact category.  These scores 
are averaged in the rightmost column of Table 14.   
Table 14 shows the fuels SMEs rated almost all incidents medium with one high.  The data 
shows that the respondents put a high degree of importance on the accuracy of the data in their 
database.  The impact of real-time data on the HMI and the computer hard drive failure averaged 
to medium.  Lastly, the respondents attach a much lower importance on the accuracy of data in 
and communications to systems external to their own.  This concludes the analysis of the survey, 
the next section discusses reduction of IA controls in the attack tree.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Alter Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) 
database data L H M H H H H
Alter FMD real time Human-Machine 
Interface (HMI) data M M M M H H M
Cause the FMD computer hard drive 
to crash L H M M M L M
Transmit a false report to the Fuels 
Enterprise System L M M M M L M
Disrupt FMD Communications L M L L M M L/M
Incident Impacting the Fuels Mission
Respondent 
(Low, Med, High)
Mode
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Table 14. Incident Impact Scores 
 
 
Reduction of IA controls in attack tree  
In building the attack tree, some of the IA controls were eliminated either because they 
were not implemented by the WPAFB fuels operation, or because the particular attack was not 
impacted by the IA control.  For instance, at the time of this research, the wireless point of sale 
devices were non-operational.  Therefore the wireless IA control was not considered.  Also, since 
this research focuses on a specific type of cyber attack, any IA controls associated with physical 
security and breach of trust were not considered as well.  This process eliminated 14 IA Controls, 
see Table 15. IA Controls Eliminated for non-applicability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Alter Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) database data          10 80 50 100 70 60 61.7
Alter FMD real time Human-Machine Interface (HMI) data 35 30 50 15 75 75 46.7
Cause the FMD computer hard drive to crash                     10 85 50 45 40 5 39.2
Transmit a false report to the Fuels Enterprise System 3 20 50 40 25 5 23.8
Disrupt FMD Communications 3 40 10 5 15 20 15.5
Incident Impacting the Fuels Mission
Respondent Impact 
(Low, Med, High)
Average 
Rating
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Table 15. IA Controls Eliminated for Non-applicability 
Management Controls 
Planning 
Operational Controls 
Personnel Security 
Physical and Environmental Protection 
Control Center/Control Room 
Portable Devices 
Cabling 
Contingency Planning 
Disaster Recovery Planning 
Media Protection 
Technical Controls 
Physical Token Authentication 
Virtual Local Area Network 
Wireless 
Encryption 
Virtual Private Network 
 
Specific attack scenarios were chosen which broadly matched attacks listed in the SANS 
(SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute top 20 security risks for 2007 (Safier, Rouse, 
Paller, Kotkov, Sarwate, Skoudis, et al., 2007).  The probability of adversary success for each of 
these attack scenarios will form the Y-axis of the risk matrix.  The specific attack tree leaf node 
actions were examined within the five chosen cyber attacks.  See Appendix F for Leaf Node, 
Effect Mapping for mapping of attack tree vulnerabilities to attacker effects.   
After eliminating IA controls that are not applicable, the remaining IA controls which are 
associated with the 5 cyber attack scenarios are listed in Table 16.   
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Table 16. IA Controls Associated with 5 Cyber Attack Scenarios 
Management Controls 
Risk Assessment 
System and Service Acquisition 
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments 
Operational Controls 
Configuration Management 
System and Information Integrity 
Malicious Code Detection 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
Patch Management 
Incident Response 
Awareness and Training 
Technical Controls 
Identification and Authentication 
Password Authentication 
Role-Based Access Control 
Web Servers 
Dial-up Modems 
Audit and Accountability 
 
Attack Tree Analysis 
The five attack scenarios were derived from the Reduced Base Stuxnet Attack Tree in the 
SecureITree software.  See Appendix C for Reduced Base Stuxnet Attack Tree.  The probability 
of adversary success at the root node and the eight major sub-trees were calculated, see Table 17.  
A number of observations emerge from the calculated probability of adversary success values.  
One, the variability between the highest scenario probability and the lowest is .13 on a 0 to 1 
point scale.  So the probabilities of all of the 5 scenarios fall within a small 13% band of the 
scale.  Looking at the major sub-trees for all of the attack scenarios, there is a significant range in 
values from the lowest to the highest probability.  For all the attack scenarios the range is .9219, 
which covers approximately 92% of the scale.  Finally, most of the major sub-trees within the 
attack scenarios when compared to each other have little variability.  This is a product of the how 
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the attack tree was created.  Many of the major sub-trees have only AND nodes, or few OR 
nodes which dramatically reduces the potential values of the probability of adversary success of 
that sub-tree.   
Table 17. Probability of Adversary Success of Specific Attacks 
 
 
 
 
 
The IA controls which influenced the success of the five attack scenarios are listed in 
Table 18.  For the specific implementation at the WPAFB fuels operation, these 16 IA controls 
influence the success of the five attack scenarios.   
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Step 7 Project Files 0.1000 0.3515 0.4863 0.0781 0.4910 0.2769 0.3840 1.0000 0.3960
Vulnerable WinCC 0.1000 0.4930 0.4863 0.0781 0.0540 0.2769 0.3840 0.5075 0.2975
Print Spooler 0.1000 0.3515 0.4863 0.0781 0.0540 0.2769 0.3840 1.0000 0.3414
Server Service 0.1000 0.4930 0.4863 0.0781 0.4910 0.2769 0.3840 1.0000 0.4137
Network Shares 0.1000 0.3515 0.4863 0.0781 0.0540 0.2769 0.3840 1.0000 0.3414
Attack Scenario
Probability of Adversary Success per Major Sub-tree
Overall 
Probablity of 
Adversary 
Success
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Table 18. IA Controls Influential in Securing against Remote Cyber Attack  
Management Controls 
Risk Assessment 
System and Service Acquisition 
Certification, Accreditation, and Security 
Assessments 
Operational Controls 
Configuration Management 
System and Information Integrity 
Malicious Code Detection 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
Patch Management 
Incident Response 
Awareness and Training 
Technical Controls 
Identification and Authentication 
Password Authentication 
Role-Based Access Control 
Web Servers 
Dial-up Modems 
Audit and Accountability 
 
Risk Level Matrix 
The responses from Part III – Impact Category Refinement of the survey and the 
probability of adversary success from the attack trees of the five attack scenarios were combined 
into the Risk Level Matrix, Figure 14.  In the matrix, all of the risk values lie in the medium-
medium area of the graph except attack #1, which falls into the high-medium area.  The IA 
controls associated with the actions of all the attack scenarios have very little variation, so it is 
difficult to draw meaningful information about the significance of IA controls from this Risk 
Level Matrix.  In order draw a meaningful result, it is necessary to break the attack scenarios 
apart into the major sub-trees in a modified risk level matrix.   
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Figure 14. Risk Level Matrix 
 
The probabilities of the major sub-trees of the attack scenarios were graphed separately in 
Figure 15. Modified Risk Level Matrix.   
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Figure 15. Modified Risk Level Matrix 
 
When broken into its constituent parts, there is much variability in the probability of 
adversary success values of the major sub-trees.  Also, some of the actions are not possible for 
the victim to defend against.  For instance, the select exploit sub-tree has a very low probability 
of adversary success, but provides no data regarding the strength of IA controls.  There are no IA 
controls that affect the adversary in this case because all of the actions the adversary takes are 
separate from the target network and organization.  For the sub-trees that do have IA controls 
associated with them, the lower the probability of adversary success, the more significant the IA 
control is to defending the system.  The tasks and IA controls that fall into the low portion of the 
risk level matrix are the most significant in defending the system.  In Figure 15, the area shaded 
in green contains the major sub-trees that contain the most influential IA controls.  The gain 
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access and deploy exploit are the only sub-trees that fall within the low area on the Modified 
Risk Matrix, see Figure 16.   
 
 
Figure 16.  Gain Access and Deploy Exploit major sub-trees 
 
The 14 most influential IA controls in securing the fuels SCADA system against a Stuxnet-
like attack are listed in Table 19. Most Influential IA Controls.   
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Table 19. Most Influential IA Controls 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented an analysis of the data collected in the WPAFB fuels operations 
SMEs survey.  It then examined the probability of adversary success of the five specific attack 
scenarios.  These two sets of values were then combined to create the X and Y axis of the risk 
level matrix.  The risk matrix was then analyzed to determine the most influential IA controls in 
securing the SCADA system.  The next chapter describes conclusions and recommendations for 
future work.    
Management Controls
Risk Assessment
Certification, Accreditation, and 
Security Assessments
System and Service Acquisition
Operational Controls
Awareness and Training
Configuration Management
Incident Response
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Malicious Code Detection
Patch Management
System and Information Integrity
Technical Controls
Audit and Accountability
Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
Role-Based Access Control
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
This research provided insight into which IA controls are most significant for network 
defenders and SCADA systems managers/operators to focus on in order to ensure the security of 
critical infrastructures against a Stuxnet-like exploit.  An attack tree was built based on the 
WPAFB fuels operation.  The attack tree was populated with IA controls which were then 
associated with leaf node actions.  System security effectiveness values and the probability of 
attack success was determined for each leaf node and applied to the attack tree.  The overall 
probability of adversary success for the five specific attack scenarios were determined using 
SecureITree software.  The incidents associated with the five specific attack scenarios were rated 
by AF fuels operation SMEs.  Finally, the probability of adversary success and SME impact 
were incorporated into a risk level matrix.  The risk level matrix provided additional insight into 
the most significant IA controls.   
All actions in the attack tree are not necessary to achieve a successful attack.  Certain sets 
of leaf node actions are more significant to achieving success than others.  The probability of 
success of a critical sub-tree of a cyber attack is a significant indicator of the overall probability 
of adversary success.  A critical sub-tree with a low probability of success was the limiting factor 
of the five specific attack scenarios.  Barring physical access or insider assistance/knowledge, a 
cyber attack is not possible without the exploitation of a vulnerability, therefore the IA controls 
that deal with preventing an attacker from gaining access are very significant to the security of 
the SCADA system.  This research shows that the key actions of a remote cyber attack is gaining 
access to the target computer via the exploitation of a vulnerability and deploying malicious 
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code.  The IA controls associated with these leaf node actions are the most influential IA 
controls.   
The results of this study are useful for managers who make the ultimate decision on 
which IA controls provide the greatest return on investment in securing a SCADA system.  If an 
organization cannot implement all of the IA controls, they should focus on controls listed in 
Table 20. in order to protect against a Stuxnet-like cyber attack. 
Table 20. Most influential IA Controls 
 
The IA controls have been designed primarily to address IT systems security issues.  
SCADA systems are slowly transitioning toward IT-like systems, but the move has not fully 
occurred.  Caution is warranted when introducing these solutions to a SCADA environment and 
Management Controls
Risk Assessment
Certification, Accreditation, and 
Security Assessments
System and Service Acquisition
Operational Controls
Awareness and Training
Configuration Management
Incident Response
Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Malicious Code Detection
Patch Management
System and Information Integrity
Technical Controls
Audit and Accountability
Identification and Authentication
Password Authentication
Role-Based Access Control
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they may need to be specially trailed in order to work properly (Stouffer et al., 2008).  Therefore 
the operational reality facing SCADA operators makes implementation of a number of the most 
influential IA controls listed in Table 20 problematic.  SCADA operators are less likely to fully 
implement patch management, role-based access controls, malicious code detection, and 
intrusion detection and prevention.  According to a number of ICS security assessment 
conducted by DHS (2009), poor patch management and weak authentication were among the top 
ICS software vulnerabilities observed.  This indicates that SCADA operators are less inclined to 
implement proper patch management and role-based access controls.  Furthermore, there is 
concern that the malicious code detection IA control will cause latency due to computational 
overhead affecting the real-time performance of SCADA systems.  Also, that updating virus 
signatures further exposes the SCADA system to attacks from the Internet (Krutz, 2006).  
Finally, it is unlikely the intrusion detection and prevention IA control will be implemented in an 
effective manner because most IDS‟ are not capable of monitoring SCADA protocols for 
suspicious behaviors (Stamp, Campbell, Depoy, Dillinger & Young, 2004). 
The research methodology applied in this study is a sound approach to identify which IA 
controls are most influential to SCADA system security.  The methodology partially addresses 
the future work described by Igure (2007) to find relative risks of the various vulnerabilities of 
the system.  The methodology also incorporates factors called for by Byres et al. (2004) to use an 
attack tree to aggregate subordinate node values and site specific parameters such as known 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures.  In Mendezllovet‟s (2010) research in codifying IA controls 
for DOD SCADA systems, there was perfect agreement among survey respondents that 
certification and accreditation was ranked last as an effective IA control.  They also ranked 
encryption as a high technical control.  He suspected there is a disconnect in how the CE and IT 
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communities view the relative importance of these controls.  This research shows that 
certification and accreditation is important in defending against a cyber attack.  Similarly, 
encryption was not found to be a significant IA control in defending against a cyber attack.  This 
study shows evidence supporting his suspicion of a disconnect of the ranking of IA controls 
within the IT and CE communities. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Based on known limitations and current constraints, four extensions of this study are 
proposed.  One potential extension of this research is to conduct research on a SCADA operation 
where the AIS is more tightly integrated into the physical control mechanisms of the operation.  
An examination of such an operation might produce a greater range of risk and may include the 
IA controls that were not included in this study.  Also, as a related item, a metric that describes 
the degree to which a SCADA system is coupled into the physical infrastructure could be 
developed.   
A second research option is to focus on the remote aspects of other cyber attacks.  There 
is an opportunity to apply other known cyber exploits in a similar manner using the same 
methodology.  Additionally, the study of physical access components of an attack would show 
which IA controls are most significant to physical security. 
A third extension is to take the attack tree developed in this research and refine it by 
including a source of data to more objectively assign values to both the system security 
effectiveness and the probability of attack success.  Also, the addition of more technical details 
may answer technical issues related to securing SCADA systems.   
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Finally, another researcher could take the results and extend them to fuels operations 
across the DOD or other critical infrastructures.  The inclusion of commercial industry, 
proprietary data would assist in extrapolating to a more general case.   
Summary 
This research showed which IA controls are most influential for network defenders and 
SCADA system managers and operators to focus on in order to ensure the security of critical 
infrastructures against a Stuxnet-like exploit.  Since this attack vector is the most advanced 
exploit found to date against critical infrastructure, this research is timely and relevant in 
identifying the critical IA controls which are most effective in preventing a successful attack.  
Just as significant the methodology used in this research is a sound approach to answering 
questions about system security.  It provides a broadly applicable and flexible framework to 
answer other systems security questions for both IT and SCADA systems with only minor 
modification.    
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Appendix A:  Roles and Responsibilities of Sector- 
Specific Federal Agencies (Bush, 2003) 
 
 
  
Federal Agency Sector
Department of Agriculture Agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products)
Health and Human Services
Public health, healthcare, and food (other 
than meat, poultry, egg products)
Environmental Protection Agency Drinking water and water treatment systems
Department of Energy
Energy, including the production refining, 
storage, and distribution of oil and gas, and 
electric power except for commercial nuclear 
power facilities
Department of the Treasury Banking and finance
Department of the Interior National monuments and icons
Department of Defense Defense industrial base
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Appendix B:  Base Stuxnet Attack Tree 
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Appendix C:  Reduced Base Stuxnet Attack Tree 
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Appendix D:  Five Chosen Attack Scenarios 
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WinCC Attack Scenario 
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Server Service Attack Scenario 
Page 1 of 3 
  
102 
Page 2 of 3 
  
  
103 
Page 3 of 3
  
104 
Network Shares Attack Scenario 
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Appendix E: Summary of Indicator Values 
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Appendix F:  Leaf Node, Effect Mapping 
Network Device Leaf Node  Stuxnet vulnerability Leaf node Effect 
Exploit vulnerable application Step 7 Project files 
Alter Fuels Manager Defense 
(FMD) database data            
Exploit vulnerable application Exploit Vulnerable WinCC 
Alter FMD real time Human-
Machine Interface (HMI) data    
Exploit vulnerable Windows 
XP Operating System 
Exploit Print Spooler vulnerability  
Cause the computer hard 
drive where FMD resides to 
crash 
Network Server Exploit vulnerable Server Service 
Transmit a false report to the 
Fuels Enterprise System 
Network Server 
Exploit Vulnerable Network 
Shares 
Disrupt FMD 
Communications 
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Appendix G: System Security Effectiveness Values 
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each of the following 
technologies in place at your 
organization in detecting and/ 
or countering security events?    
(Scale: Very effective, Somewhat 
effective, Not very effective, Not 
at all  effective, Don’t know, Not 
applicable-don’t use) (Base: 
experienced a cyber security 
event during the past 12 
months)
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Percent “Very” or “Somewhat” 
Effective 2010
Statefull firewalls 86% 0.65
Electronic access control systems 82%
Access controls 80%
Password complexity 79% 0.59
Encryption 76% 0.57
Heuristics-based SPAM filtering 74%
Application layer firewalls 71%
Host-based firewalls 68%
Network-based antivirus 68% 0.51
Identity management Systems 67% 0.50
Network IDS/IPS 66% 0.50 0.50
Policy-based network connections & 
enforcement 66%
0.50
RBL-based SPAM filtering 66%
Surveillance 66% 0.50 0.50
Wireless encryption/ protection 66% 0.50 0.50 0.50
Automated patch management 65% 0.49 0.49
Host-based antivirus 63% 0.47
Badging 62% 0.47
Change control/configuration 
management systems 62%
0.47
Network-based policy enforcement 62%
Rights management 62%
Multi-factor/strong authentication 61% 0.46 0.46
Network access control (NAC) 60%
Role-based authentication 57% 0.43
Host-based policy-enforcement 56%
Application configuration monitoring 53%
0.40 0.40
- Denotes  System Secruity Effectiveness  va lue for particular IA control
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or countering security events?    
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months)
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Percent “Very” or “Somewhat” 
Effective 2010
Host-based IDS/ IPS 53% 0.40
Manual patch management 53% 0.40
Host-based SPAM 51%
Network-based 
monitoring/forensics/ESM tool 51%
0.38
Software development tools (& 
processes) 50%
###
Host based anti-SPAM 47%
Data tracking 46% 0.35 0.35
Host base configuration 
management/change control 45%
0.34
Application monitoring & trending 44% 0.33 0.33
Digital signatures 43% 0.32
One-time passwords 43% 0.32 0.32
Wireless monitoring 41% 0.31 0.31
Data loss prevention (DLP) tools 39% 0.29
Application signing 38%
Automated integrity controls 38% 0.29 0.29
Anomaly detection system 32% 0.24 0.24
Biometrics 30% 0.23
Keystroke monitoring 24% 0.18
=(Percent “Very” or “Somewhat” Effective) * .75
Survey percetnages are multiplied by .75 consistent with the mid value between very effective and somwhat effective per the scale below.
Security System effectiveness 
1.  Very effective  (value .9)
2.  Somewhat Effective  (value .6)
3.  Not very effective (value .3)
4.  Ineffective (value .1)
5.  Not applicable (value 0)
- Denotes  System Secruity Effectiveness  va lue for particular IA control
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Page 3 of 3  
IA Control
System Secuirty Effectivness 
value (E)
Management Controls
Planning 0.5
System and Service Acquisition 0.38
Risk Assessment 0.33
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments 0.2 *(4 of 4)
Operational Controls
Malicious Code Detection 0.51
Physical and Environmental Protection 0.5
Portable Devices 0.5
Intrusion Detection and Prevention 0.5
Incident Response 0.5
Patch Management 0.49
Personnel Security 0.47
Awareness and Training 0.47 *(8 of 15)
Configuration Management 0.47
Contingency Planning 0.44 *(10 of 15)
System and Information Integrity 0.4
Control Center/Control Room 0.38
Media Protection 0.34 *(13 of 15)
Disaster Recovery Planning 0.29
Cabling 0.15 *(15 of 15)
Technical Controls
Audit and Accountability 0.65
Password Authentication 0.59
Encryption 0.57
Identification and Authentication 0.5
Wireless 0.5
Virtual Private Network 0.48 *(6 of 11)
Physical Token Authentication 0.46
Web Servers 0.45 *(8 of 11)
Role-Based Access Control 0.43
Virtual Local Area Network 0.38 *(10 of 11)
Dial-up Modems 0.32
* Values on Items in blue are extrapolated 
from Mendezlovett's (2010) work in ranking 
IA controls.
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Appendix H: Probability of Attack Success Matrix 
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Appendix I:  Survey Instrument 
Incident Impact Rating of Fuels Operators 
 
Primary Investigators:  Maj Jeffrey Hemmes and Mr. J. Lopez Jr. 
Student Researcher:  Maj Jason R. Nielsen 
Research Institution:  Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio. 
Research Sponsor:  HQ USAF A4/7  
Purpose:  Collect impact ratings for specific incidents affecting DoD Fuels Operations.   
Background:   This research effort seeks to discover which Information Assurance (IA) controls 
are most influential for defending the networked Fuels industrial control systems against a 
specific cyber attack.  By examining the success probability of specific attack vectors along with 
the impact of potential incidents, an overall risk metric can be calculated.  This survey requests 
Air Force Fuels SMEs to provide an impact rating to specific cyber incidents that could impact 
the operational mission of a Fuels Management organization.  
The survey is organized into three parts: (1) Demographics, (2) Impact rating and          
(3) Impact category refinement.  
 
 
 
  
Disclaimer: This research was conducted in compliance with DoD requirements regarding the protection of human 
subjects 
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PART I - Demographics: 
1. How many years of experience in operating or managing Fuels Industrial Control Systems do 
you have? (round values up, place an X next to only one) 
 
___ 1-5 years 
___ 6-10 years 
___ 11-15 years 
___16-20 years 
___ More than 21 years 
 
2. List all computer security or network security training you have completed in the last 5 years.  
___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
3. List all industry certifications you have successfully completed in the last 5 years.            
(e.g. Quality Assurance Certification, Project Management Professional,  Security+) 
___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
4. What is your primary affiliation with the government?  (place an X next to only one) 
___ Contractor 
___ Military (Reserve, Guard, or Active Duty) 
___ Civil Service employee 
___ Other (Describe) _______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: This research was conducted in compliance with DoD requirements regarding the protection of human 
subjects 
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PART II – Impact Rating: 
 
Instructions: This portion of the survey will ask you to rate the impact magnitude of various 
incidents on the Fuels mission according to the definitions provided in Table 1.  Read through 
Table 1 before proceeding.   
 
Table 1. Magnitude of Impact Definitions (source: NIST SP 800-30) 
 
Magnitude  
of  
Impact 
Impact Definition 
High 
Exercise of the vulnerability: 
(1) May result in the highly costly loss of major tangible assets or resources; 
(2) May significantly violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation, 
or interest; or 
(3) May result in human death or serious injury. 
Medium 
Exercise of the vulnerability: 
(1) May result in the costly loss of tangible assets or resources; 
(2) May violate, harm, or impede an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest; 
or 
(3) May result in human injury. 
Low 
Exercise of the vulnerability: 
(1) May result in the loss of some tangible assets or resources or 
(2) May noticeably affect an organization’s mission, reputation, or interest. 
 
Note: You can make the following assumptions when determining the impact ratings:  
1. The incidents are listed in random order. 
2. The incidents are mutually exclusive events. 
3. Only one incident can occur at a time. 
4. An incident is considered a singular event, meaning they can only occur once. 
5. One incident will not cause another event to occur. 
 
 Please proceed to the next page to provide impact ratings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Disclaimer: This research was conducted in compliance with DoD requirements regarding the protection of human 
subjects 
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Instructions: Provide your response in the “Impact Rating” column for each incident listed in 
table 2 below. Select only one impact rating for each incident (e.g. Low, Medium, or High) 
according to the definitions provided in table 1.  
 
 
Table 2. Mission Impact Rating 
Incident Impacting the Fuels Mission 
Impact Rating 
(Low, Med, High) 
Alter Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) database data           (For 
example - change status of training for personnel, change status of 
fuel truck maintenance, alter fuel temperature conversion 
calculation, falsify report from lab, cause billing errors, cause errors in 
fuels inventory) 
 
Alter FMD real time Human-Machine Interface (HMI) data 
(For example - change visual indicator of tank fuel level) 
 
Cause the computer hard drive where FMD resides to crash                     
(For example – cause non-recoverable computer hard drive crash) 
 
Transmit a false report to the Fuels Enterprise System   
Disrupt FMD Communications                                              (For example 
– prevent in-bound and out-bound FMD communications with 
external systems) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: This research was conducted in compliance with DoD requirements regarding the protection of human 
subjects 
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PART III – Impact Category Refinement: 
Instructions:  For each incident ranked L, M, or H in Part II, give it a numeric score 
within the defined range.  Scores should take into account all other events that can occur 
in that magnitude of impact category.  Assign scores using the following guidelines:  
Low impact (1 to 10), Medium impact (11 to 50), High impact (51 to 100).   Refer back 
to Part II as needed for the rank (L,M,H) you assigned.  
Examples: 
Low impact:  At the post office the impact of running out of “forever” 
stamps is low.  So the score must fall within 1 to 10.  Other incidents that 
have a low impact include long wait times (2), customer complaints (1), 
and a new federal holiday (3).  Among all of the possible low impact 
incidents, running out of forever stamps scores 5. 
Medium impact:  At the post office the impact of a broken mail sorting 
machine is medium.  So the score must fall between 11 and 50.  Other 
incidents that have a medium impact include postal employee calling in 
sick (20), snow storm (40), and a mail truck in maintenance depot (25).  
Among all of the possible medium impact incidents, a broken mail sorting 
machine scores 30. 
High impact:  At the post office the impact of the roof caving in high.  So 
the score must fall within 51 to 100.  Other incidents that have a high 
impact include a phoned-in bomb threat (80), power outage (75), and a 
point of sale outage (55).  Among all of the possible high impact incidents, 
the roof caving in scores 70. 
 
Score the following - Low (1 to 10); Medium (11 to 50); High (51 to 100): 
 
Mission Impacting Rating Refinement Score 
Alter Fuels Manager Defense (FMD) database data             
Alter FMD real time Human-Machine Interface (HMI) data     
Cause the computer hard drive where FMD resides to crash  
Transmit a false report to the Fuels Enterprise System  
Disrupt FMD Communications  
 
Thank you for your participation in this survey.  If you have any follow-on questions you 
can contact Maj Jason Nielsen at (318) 834-6662 or Mr. Lopez at (937) 255-6565 at 
extension 4637.  If this survey was E-mailed to you, please E-mail it back attached to a 
signed E-mail to jason.nielsen@afit.edu.   
  
Disclaimer: This research was conducted in compliance with DoD requirements regarding the protection of human 
subjects 
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